But Kossuth's antipathy towards Görgei prevented him from accepting Szemere's decision, and he named Lieutenant General Antal Vetter, the deputy minister of war, as commander-in-chief instead.

[6] Vetter called a council of war, proposing to march towards Abony, and attack the enemy left wing stationing there, but two of the generals, János Damjanich and Lajos Aulich, opposed this plan, saying that in the case of an unsuccess, the Hungarian army will be not able to retreat on the Tisza's left bank on the bridge from Cibakháza, and the only bridge nearby, which was at Szolnok, was burned in January by Dembiński.

[8] As a result of this, General Damjanich lost his position as army commander, and because of this, he started a quarrel with Vetter, threatening him with execution in case of if he failed to be successful with this new grouping.

[8] So finally, unwillingly, Kossuth had to accept this proposal, naming Görgei "during the period of Vetter's illness", the "provisional commander-in-chief" of the main Hungarian force.

The imperial forces under Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz had 55,000 men and 214 guns and rockets organized in 3 army corps led by Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić (I.

[13] On 23 March the commander of the I. corps, Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić, informed Windisch-Grätz about the crossing of the Tisza of "important forces" at Cibakháza, that they planning a general attack against his positions, and because of this he asked for at least one of Schlik's III.

So he ordered Schlik to conduct with his corps a reconnaissance in the direction of Bag-Hatvan-Gyöngyös, if he meets superior enemy forces, to retreat to Bag, if not, to not advance further as Gyöngyös.

[14] Around the time of the battle, Hatvan was a market town of 2300 inhabitants, which most important buildings were the Catholic church, the provostry, the castle, the guest house, the postal office, and the salthouse.

[15] The essence of the new operational plan elaborated on 30–31 April by General Klapka, adjusted by Lieutenant Colonel József Bayer, was to attract the attention of Windisch-Grätz on the VII.

First of all, they had to gather information about the enemy, which according to the intelligence reports, were aligned behind the Galga river, building trenches to stop an eventual Hungarian attack.

corps was to be possible to conduct operations on its own for several days, without the help of the other Hungarian units, and if necessary, to stop any enemy attacks, even if they were made by superior forces.

[23] As a result of this, Major Lajos Zámbelly did not want to risk a confrontation with the Austrians, so he retreated from Hatvan towards Hort after destroying the bridge over the Zagyva.

The Hungarian battery responded by retreating behind the range of the rockets and with repeated changing of its positions, stopped the Austrian advance towards the rear of the Poeltenberg division.

[24] But the Austrian jägers and the platoon sent on the left wing, as well as the cavalry, could not advance enough to harm the retreating Poeltenberg division, do to the effective actions of the hussars and the Hungarian batteries.

[24] Here Poeltenberg ordered his troops to rest in the camp installed east from Hort, behind a creek but advised them to be ready of an eventual Austrian night attack.

He did not give an order to attack, because he was not sure about the Austrian troops' strength, and he was informed that in Apc, Jobbágyi and Csécse were stationing 5000-6000 soldiers strong enemy detachments.

Left from the road, the brigade's Congreve rocket battery took the position, with a company from the Wilhelm infantry battalion, as protection against an eventual attack.

[26] The Austrians here had the most favorable natural defensive positions because the mountain here had steep slopes, and on the other hand the strait between the Zagyva river and the Strázsa hill could be easily closed and defended.

[29] The Austrians left wing retreated towards Hatvan, where 2 batteries and a couple of Congreve rockets launching racks, supported by jägers and cavalry units, took defensive positions on the outskirts of the town.

[29] But the Hungarian artillery continued the successful bombardment of the Austrians, and after they hit and destroyed an ammunition wagon, the enemy batteries from the left wing started to retreat in the city.

[33] Although their artillery could not force the Austrians to retreat, nevertheless they managed to prevent them to attack, while the infantry units changed their positions to avoid being hit by the enemy projectiles.

[33] The evening was near when the Gáspár division and the Kossuth brigade were finally ordered to advance, while the Austrians retreated without any fight, enabling the Hungarians to occupy the vine-growing hills.

When Wysocki, during the noon hours, arrived in Csány, he heard the cannonade from the direction of Hatvan, so he immediately gave the order to advance, threatening Schlik's right wing with encirclement.

[33] Arriving there around 5:00 p.m. the vanguard of the Wysocki division, represented by the Czillich brigade approached Hatvan, while the Ferdinand hussars led by Major Szentmiklósy and the cavalry battery under the leadership of Captain Német attacked the Austrian artillery, protected by 3 companies of Civalart uhlans from the heights in front of the town.

[33] The fight on the streets of Hatvan was especially fierce in the main square of the city, where the Austrians tried to hold back as long as possible the Hungarians, to dismantle the bridges.

[30] With this battle Colonel Gáspár overachieved his duty, defeating and chasing away one of the best Austrian corps, led by one of the most capable imperial officers, although Görgei did not demand this from him, his mission being to tie down the enemy troops on the Zagyva's line.

[25] Although this was his first battle as a corps commander Gáspár, made the best choice by not attacking the Austrians in their very favorable defensive positions from the front, but encircling them, first from the right, then, after the arrival of the detached units of the III.

corps, also from the left, forcing Schlik, to retreat without fighting from the center, thanks to which, they were the attacking side, at the end of the battle the Hungarians had only minor losses.

Being isolated, from the other three corps for a couple of days, made Gáspár's situation dangerous, because an Austrian attack with important forces could easily defeat his troops, which would have opened the way to the temporary capital city of Debrecen.

[31] Windisch-Grätz continued to be unsure about the plans and dispositions of the Hungarian main army, and because of this, he remained mostly incapable of stopping them from advancing from two sides on his headquarters at Gödöllő.