Once in Jinyang, Zhao Xiangzi, following the suggestions of Zhang Mengtan, issued orders to refill the granaries and the treasuries, repair walls, make arrows, and melt copper pillars for metal.
By virtue of past governance, the treasuries, granaries, and arsenals were filled within three days, and the walls repaired within five.
All buildings under three stories high were submerged, and the people of Jinyang were obliged to live in nest-like perches above the water and hang their kettles from the scaffolding in order to cook.
[9] Zhao Xiangzi asked Zhang Mengtan, "Our provisions are gone, our strength and resources are exhausted, the officials are starving and ill, and I fear we can hold out no longer.
"[10] Zhang Mengtan, much alarmed, persuaded Zhao not to surrender but instead send him out to negotiate with the houses of Wei and Han.
Xi, knowing that his warning fell to deaf ears, excused himself from the battlefield by going to the State of Qi as an envoy.
Hearing this, Zhang Mengtan urged Zhao Xiangzi to take action immediately, lest Zhi Yao changes his mind.
[13] Zhao then dispatched Zhang Mengtan to the camps of Wei and Han, alerting them of the time of the final attack.
In 403 BC, the Wei, Zhao and Han lords all went to King Weilie of Zhou in Luoyang and were made marquises in their own right, establishing the three states of Zhao, Wei, and Han, ushering in the beginning of the Warring States period by Sima Guang's definition.
The Legalist thinker Han Feizi of the late Warring States period used this battle as an example of failure via greed and perversity, one of the "Ten Faults" that a ruler should not have.
The Song Dynasty statesman Sima Guang, in his Zizhi Tongjian, attribute Zhi Yao's failure to his lacking virtue compared to his talents, and thus invited disaster.