The raid was planned by the PRA and another rebel group, the UNLF-AD, to seize weapons in order to start an insurgency against the government of Ugandan President Milton Obote who had assumed power after the disputed December 1980 general election.

Upon arriving at the Kabamba Military Barracks, the group was unable to deceive or silently subdue two sentries, causing a shootout and alerting the camp.

[5] In an attempt to gain influence in the country's future government and military, the different factions within the UNLA enlisted thousands of fighters[6] and began to conspire against each other.

As a result of the political infighting and powers of the armed factions, Uganda's first post-Amin provisional government led by President Yusuf Lule was unstable.

In May 1980, Binaisa was also deposed and Uganda fell under the control of the UNLF's Military Commission that was supposed to rule until the scheduled December 1980 general election.

[7] For instance, Obote hindered the integration of thousands of fighters loyal to Museveni into the regular army, with many ex-FRONASA cadres instead being demobilized.

[2][8] Even though the demobilization caused considerable unrest within the ex-FRONASA faction, Museveni reasoned with his supporters to surrender their guns to prevent an escalation.

With a small force consisting of ex-FRONASA officers and his bodyguards, Museveni secretly organized the Popular Resistance Army (PRA).

Pro-Obote forces moved to assassinate ex-FRONASA officers in the UNLA to prevent them from defecting or rebelling, depriving the PRA of potential recruits and insiders.

Ex-FRONASA fighters also began to carry out revenge killings against ex-members of Kikosi Maalum, loyalists of Obote, worsening the tensions.

[14] Despite these difficulties, Bush War veteran and researcher Frederick Guweddeko stated that Museveni told the UFF and UFM that he still had over 10,000 supporters within the UNLA who were waiting to launch a large-scale rebellion.

Accordingly, the UFF and UFM decided to wait both for the arrival of the Libyan weapons shipments as well as Museveni's promised uprising within the UNLA to start their own rebellions.

[8][15] Most importantly, the attack was supposed to inspire ex-FRONASA fighters, both those who had returned to civilian life or enlisted in the UNLA, to revolt across the country.

[15] As the Kabamba Military Barracks were used as a training camp, the location could also be infiltrated by PRA supporters, providing the rebels with insiders and intelligence.

[8] Ex-FRONASA members who worked at Kabamba informed the PRA that security at the base usually dropped around 8:00am, when the garrison would switch from a state of alert to go training or take a break.

[17] Political scientist Jeremy M. Weinstein specifies that the camp housed about 1,500 men, including over 100 Tanzanian guards and trainers; the rest were UNLA trainees.

Museveni's pickup truck had a flat tire at Katigondo; as they had no replacement, the PRA leader was forced to walk 19 kilometres (12 mi) to Nyendo where he asked a friend, Nathan Ruyondo, to loan him his Peugeot 304.

[13] The UNLF-AD members, assuming that the PRA had been attacked by security forces,[1][10] had initially decided to relocate to another position to observe their rendezvous area.

[13][c] Undeterred, Museveni split his PRA force into three sections: The first, led by Sam Magara would strike at the armoury, the second under Tumwine would eliminate the main gate's sentries,[22] and the third under Hannington Mugabi would try to raid the quartermaster's store.

[25] However, the shooting alarmed a Tanzanian soldier who was guarding the arms depot, and he promptly barricaded himself, preventing the rebels from gaining access.

[28] With the troops of Magara and Tumwine back at the gate, Museveni agreed to retreat, but first ordered his men to take whatever guns and ammunition they could find at the parts of the camp which they had taken, namely the guardroom, communications center, and military transport section.

[1] Directly after the battle, several PRA members regarded their raid as a failure, and Museveni had to raise their morale by framing the operation as a partial success.

He described the rebels' intelligence gathering before the raid as "first rate",[29] and argued that the PRA's ability to dominate the battle despite being numerically extremely inferior to the base's defenders was impressive.

He also pointed out that the rebels had been able to achieve all objectives besides their main aim of capturing the armoury, as they had held all administrative and communications nodes in the base for an hour.

Comparing it to the start of another guerrilla war, namely Fidel Castro's attack on the Moncada Barracks, Kainerugaba stated that Museveni's operation actually went rather well,[30] and concluded that it was a "qualified success and not a catastrophe".

[33] However, Kainerugaba pointed out that the preparations for the battle had not included instructions to tackle opponents without guns: Tumwine had no training in hand-to-hand combat,[32] and the attackers had no knives.

[1] In June 1981, a new rebel coalition was organised, with the PRA and Lule's UFF agreeing to unite as the National Resistance Movement (NRM).