Without this protective movement, the Federal army under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks might strike at Johnston through passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains.
John Sedgwick and Alpheus S. Williams) returning to the immediate vicinity of Washington, D.C., freeing up other Union troops to participate in Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Peninsula Campaign against Richmond.
Despite his injury, Shields sent part of his division south of Winchester and one brigade marching to the north, seemingly abandoning the area.
He turned over tactical command of his division to Col. Nathan Kimball, who ordered the Second Brigade and some of his own troops along the Valley Turnpike.
Despite Shields's orders to pursue the Confederate cavalry, Kimball posted 16 guns and 800 infantrymen in a defensive position on the military crest of Prichard's Hill.
[5] Confederate loyalists in Winchester mistakenly informed Turner Ashby that Shields had left only four regiments and a few guns (about 3,000 men) and that these remaining troops had orders to march for Harpers Ferry in the morning.
Jackson marched aggressively north with his 3,000-man division, reduced from its peak as stragglers fell out of the column, unaware that he was soon to be attacking almost 9,000 men.
[6] Key: k = killed, w = wounded Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks (not present) Valley District, Department of Northern Virginia Maj. Gen. Thomas J.
The devoutly religious Jackson preferred to avoid battles on the Sabbath, but throughout his Civil War career he did not hesitate when military advantage could be gained.
[7] He later wrote to his wife: I felt it my duty to [attack], in consideration of the ruinous effects that might result from postponing the battle until the morning.
[8]Jackson performed no personal reconnaissance before he sent Turner Ashby on a feint against Kimball's position on the Valley Turnpike while his main force—the brigades of Col. Samuel Fulkerson and Brig.
Gen. Richard B. Garnett (the Stonewall Brigade, Jackson's own first command)—attacked the Union artillery position on Pritchard Hill.
The lead brigade under Fulkerson was repulsed, so Jackson decided to move around the Union right flank, about 2 miles west on Sandy Ridge, which appeared to be unoccupied.
Jackson's aide, Sandie Pendleton, obtained a clear view from the ridge of the Union forces arrayed against them and he estimated that there were 10,000.
"[9] Around 4 p.m, Tyler attacked Fulkerson and Garnett by using an unorthodox approach with his brigade in "close column of divisions"—a brigade front of two companies with 48 companies lined up behind them in 24 lines, in all about 75 yards wide, and 400 yards long, a formation difficult to control and lacking offensive power at the front.
Lincoln also took this opportunity to re-examine Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's plans for the defenses of Washington while the Peninsula Campaign was underway and decided that the forces were insufficient.
He eventually ordered that the corps of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, which was moving south against Richmond in support of McClellan, remain in the vicinity of the capital.