PAVN General Chu Huy Mân disengaged from the fight on the outskirts of the city, and pulled the 2nd Division into the mountains to rest, rebuild, and prepare for the next major operation.

Although the Special Forces camp had never been an obstacle to the constant infiltration of PAVN troops around it, the North Vietnamese hoped to attract major US reinforcements away from the lowland populated areas, kill or capture them and film the battle, presumably to make it look like a US Điện Biên Phủ on the eve of the 1st Paris peace conference.

Coincidentally, General William Westmoreland sent U.S. Army engineers to upgrade the camp's airstrip for sustained use by large transport aircraft in preparation for an incursion into Laos titled Operation York.

On 7 February 1968, PAVN infantry armed with satchel charges, tear gas, and flamethrowers, and reinforced with Soviet-made PT-76 amphibious tanks, successfully seized the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp.

[1]: 44  Thus, following the failed attack on Đà Nẵng, PAVN General Chu Huy Mân, Commander of Military Region 5, made the decision to pull the 2nd Division into the mountains where they could rest, resupply, and integrate replacements before going on the offensive again.

The camp was downgraded from a major outpost due to its unpredictable weather[11]: 6  and now functioned as a training centre for Civilian Irregular Defense Group program (CIDG) personnel, reconnaissance of enemy movements, and combat operations.

The 1st Regiment Headquarters made their preparations for the initial attack by regularly sending out CIDG units to conduct reconnaissance patrols around Ngok Tavak to observe enemy activities in the area.

[1]: 34  The unit was led by three members of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV): Captain John White and Warrant Officers Frank Lucas and Don Cameron.

[1]: 59 In an effort to bolster the strength of White's 11th MIKE Force company, a mortar platoon of about 35 CIDG was sent from Khâm Đức to reinforce the small garrison at Ngok Tavak during the final days of April.

On 9 May, Captain Chris Silva flew to Ngok Tavak to discuss the reliability of his troops with his Australian counterpart, but was prevented from returning to Khâm Đức due to poor weather.

[14]: 4 The initial PAVN attack had split allied formations in the garrison: the 1st and 2nd Platoons of the 11th MIKE Force company were pushed away from the eastern perimeter, while the Marines were either alone or had organized themselves into small groups of two or three, out of contact with one another.

After the 40th Battalion overran the command post, they tried to advance on the landing zone where allied soldiers had established a strong defense from fortified underground bunkers which the PAVN had failed to detect in their reconnaissance patrols.

In addition to close air support missions, medevac helicopters flew in to evacuate the wounded, and U.S. aircrews reported that they did not receive fire while flying over the enemy's area of operations.

While the wounded were being flown out, the surviving elements of the 11th MIKE Force company and the Marines consolidated their positions, even though cohesion had broken down between the allied soldiers as a result of the double-cross that occurred earlier in the battle.

[1]: 91  However, both White and Makowski knew that reinforcement was unlikely, because the two downed helicopters prevented further landings required for the insertion of additional troops, and the road between Ngok Tavak and Khâm Đức was likely to be covered by the opposing forces waiting in ambush.

[1]: 98–9  After the Marines and Mobile Strike Force personnel destroyed their unneeded equipment, they were directed to form an order-of-march out of Ngok Tavak, in order to protect the wounded and those with little infantry experience.

[1]: 100 About halfway between Ngok Tavak and Khâm Đức, White and his column climbed a mountain where they cleared the jungle to create a landing zone, and called for helicopters to evacuate the survivors.

[14]: 31–33, figure 5 At 02:45 on 10 May, in conjunction with the ground assault on Ngok Tavak, elements of the PAVN 2nd Division subjected Khâm Đức to a heavy barrage of mortar and recoilless rifle fire.

[1]: 93  Thompson's company dug in at the end of the runway nearest OP 1 with XO Peter Everts' platoon overlooking the deep ravine where caves kept the PAVN safe from B-52 strikes.

[citation needed] About six hours later, the 2/1st Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Nelson, touched down at the airfield and immediately set up defensive positions in support of Detachment A-105.

[2]: 11  By the time the first attack was stopped, the opposite end of the compound also came under fire, and by early morning tactical air-support became difficult, as PAVN troops were in close proximity with U.S. and allied forces.

The morale and discipline of the indigenous forces had sunk so low that they began to leave their defensive positions without permission, although their section of the camp was never subjected to a major ground attack.

Next in line was Lieutenant Colonel William Boyd; he was flying an airlift mission into Chu Lai Air Base, until he was diverted into Khâm Đức to extract forces and civilians there.

Major James L. Wallace flew into Khâm Đức and extracted the last group, as ammunition dumps began to explode and the aircrews reported hysteria among the Vietnamese soldiers who had lost family members in Bucher's crash.

Accounts of the battle have called it "a Khe Sanh in reverse",[22] "an embarrassing defeat",[1] "an unequivocal debacle",[22]: 166.217  "a decisive North Vietnamese and Viet Cong victory",[23][24] and "the high point for Hanoi".

[6]: xiii  Like the Tet Offensive, descriptions of the results of the battle seem to ignore the massive losses inflicted on the PAVN forces and amplify the much smaller numbers of allied dead and missing.

[6]: xx, note 32 Unlike the fight at Khe Sanh, American airpower "averted a massacre" but could not prevent the PAVN from dominating the high ground surrounding Khâm Đức.

[1]: 118  U.S. decisions at Khâm Đức at a higher command level may have been influenced by the events of Khe Sanh earlier in 1968, which were subjected to intense media comparison with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, and the clash of operational thinking between Westmoreland and senior USMC generals.

[7]: 347  From the very first day of the struggle at Khâm Đức, it was clear that ground units were not prepared for an emergency evacuation, due to the lack of experience in terms of integrating the numbers and types of aircraft in such a small geographical area.

[7]: 347 [2]: 17  Despite having lost two C-130 aircraft, U.S. pilots were undeterred from completing their mission, indeed, their bravery was exemplified by Lieutenant Colonel Joe M. Jackson, who received a Medal of Honor for the rescue of the three-man Combat Control Team.