Though the Union won a tactical victory at Kolb's Farm, Sherman's maneuver to turn the Confederate left flank appeared to be blocked.
[6] Polk was killed at Pine Mountain on June 14 and temporarily replaced by Major General William Wing Loring.
Hood's corps comprised the divisions of Major Generals Thomas C. Hindman, Carter L. Stevenson, and Alexander P. Stewart.
The railroad coming from the north veered to the northeast past Kennesaw's northern end, then turned south before reaching Marietta.
[13] On the morning of June 19, Sherman optimistically believed that the Confederates had withdrawn to the Chattahoochie River, but by the day's end he realized that assessment was wrong.
Schofield reached the place where the road from Powder Springs Church to Marietta spanned Noses Creek, but did not attempt to cross.
[16] Federal cannons took Pigeon Hill under fire, inflicting 35 casualties on French's Missouri brigade, including its commander Brigadier General Francis Cockrell.
[19] Brigadier General Jacob Dolson Cox's division of Schofield's corps made a successful crossing of Noses Creek and entrenched on the east side.
Howard's corps retook the hill previously captured by the Confederates and seized ground which enabled it to advance several hundred yards.
To fill the gap, Johnston ordered Loring to extend his corps to its right and instructed Wheeler to dismount his cavalrymen to man Hood's trenches.
In fact, Hood's corps left its original position in the morning and camped on the Powder Springs road west of Marietta in the evening.
This information prompted Hooker to order his corps to entrench on a line from Howard's right flank to Kolb's Farm on the Powder Springs-Marietta road.
South of the road facing east, Colonel Silas A. Strickland's brigade of Hascall's XXIII Corps division also fortified its position.
[30][note 1] During the early afternoon of June 22, Hood's corps moved along the Powder Springs road until it was 0.5 mi (805 m) west of Mount Zion Church.
Hood ordered his division commanders to drive the Federals toward Manning's Mill, which was 2 mi (3.2 km) west of Kolb's Farm.
Hood's daily report was unclear about what happened that day, his memoirs never referred to the Kolb's Farm action, and other Confederate sources were silent.
Apparently, he believed that the Federals were advancing in march column and that his troops were executing a powerful flank attack against an unready opponent.
Cumming's brigade, which consisted largely of former Georgia militia, advanced through dense foliage until they received a volley from the 14th Kentucky at a range of 30 ft (9.1 m).
Finally, Hascall peremptorily ordered the 14th Kentucky to withdraw to the main line; its commander Colonel George Gallup later claimed that 69 dead Confederates were found in front of his regiment's position.
[33] North of the road, Brown's and Reynolds' troops quickly drove back the 123rd New York and advanced into cleared fields in front of the brigades of Ruger and Knipe.
Stevenson's soldiers were briefly able to penetrate a hollow between Williams and Geary, but were soon compelled to recoil under the combined rifle and artillery fire.
[33] Historian Albert E. Castel estimated that Hood's attack cost his corps 1,500 killed, wounded, and missing, two-thirds of which were from Stevenson's division.
Finally, Sherman received a message from Schofield reporting that Hood's corps attacked his and Hooker's positions at Kolb's Farm and was defeated.
According to Sherman's Memoirs, written ten years after the war, he rode to the right flank on the morning of June 23 to meet with Schofield and Hooker.
Reilly found dismounted and barricaded soldiers from Brigadier General Lawrence Sullivan Ross' cavalry brigade defending the crossing.
A frustrated Sherman sent a telegram to Union Army Chief of Staff Major General Henry Halleck that, "The whole country is one vast fort ... As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready".
[42] Sherman faced three choices: use McPherson to hit Johnston's right flank, wear down the Confederates trenches by artillery barrages and short infantry advances, or make a frontal assault.
He was so fearful that Johnston might strike his vital railroad supply line near Big Shanty, that Sherman wanted McPherson to strongly guard that area.
One of his strategic missions was to prevent Johnston from reinforcing General Robert E. Lee's army, so Sherman could not allow a stalemate to develop.
Some essential features remain, however, including the Kolb farm house and family cemetery, Ward Creek, and the heights used by the Federal XX and XXIII Corps in their repulse of the Confederate assault.