The ROK troops, already demoralized and struggling to maintain a strong defensive line, were easily pushed back from their positions.

Fighting was heavy and the two sides fought to capture and recapture P'ohang-dong and An'gang-ni, with the KPA seeking to break through the Kyongju corridor as a way to attack the UN base at Pusan.

[2] From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the KPA used this strategy to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south.

[4] Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union the North Koreans were aware the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle.

[22][23] On August 26, US and ROK officers in the P'ohang-dong and Kigye area were optimistic; they congratulated each other on having repulsed what they thought was the last serious threat to the Pusan Perimeter.

[24][25] At a briefing in Taegu on August 27, Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker showed his concern over this development.

The US 21st Infantry Regiment was moving to a position north of Taegu on the morning of August 27, when Walker revoked its orders and instructed it to turn around and proceed as rapidly as possible to Kyongju and report to Coulter.

[29] Major General Kim Hong Il, the ROK I Corps commander, told him he could not attack, that there were too many casualties and the South Korean were exhausted.

That day, August 28, Walker issued a special statement addressed to the ROK, and meant also for the South Korean Minister of Defense, Shin Sung-mo.

[30] The ROK disorganization was so great in the face of continued KPA pressure that Task Force Jackson could not launch its planned attack.

[30] Also on August 29, the ROK Capital Division, with US tank and artillery support, recaptured Kigye and held it during the night against KPA counterattacks, only to lose it again at dawn.

They also found many suits of white clothing scattered on the ground, abandoned when KPA soldiers changed from civilian disguises into military uniforms.

[30] With this air action in the Kigye area, US naval vessels continued their efforts to help stop the KPA 5th Division on the east coast.

A cruiser and two destroyers concentrated their firepower on the Hunghae area 5 miles (8.0 km) north of P'ohang-dong where the KPA 5th Division's troop assembly and forward supply center were located.

Although aided by UN air attacks and artillery and naval gunfire, the ROK 3rd Division was unable to capture this hill, and suffered many casualties in the effort.

The company was unable to take Hill 99 from the well dug-in KPA who threw large numbers of hand grenades to repel all efforts to reach the top.

That battalion now took up a horseshoe-shaped defense position around the town, with some elements on high ground 2 miles (3.2 km) east where they protected the Kyongju to P'ohang-dong highway.

[33] Receiving orders to withdraw and join the regiment above Kyongju, the 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry had to fight through a KPA roadblock on the east side of the Hyongsan-gang 3 miles (4.8 km) southeast of An'gang-ni.

Faced with this big gap on his left flank, Coulter put the US 21st Infantry in the broad valley and on its bordering hills northwest of Kyongju to block any approach from that direction.

[36] At midnight, after 10 rounds of KPA mortar or artillery fire struck near it, the ROK 3rd Division command post moved to another location.

The ROK division commander, Brigadier General Lee Jun Shik and several members of his senior staff claimed they became sick.

The assistant division commander, Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, proceeding at once by jeep, arrived at Kyongju that evening.

Division troops and the US 19th Infantry Regiment started at 13:00 the next day, September 5, and, traveling over muddy roads, most of them arrived at Kyongju just before midnight.

On September 6, he ordered the US 21st Infantry to attack the next day up the valley and bordering hills that lead northwest from Kyongju into the high mountain mass in the direction of Yongch'on.

Farther north, on the left side of the valley, the ROK 17th Regiment attacked and, with the support of the US 13th Field Artillery Battalion, captured Hill 285 and held it against several KPA counterattacks.

[26] Facing this force were two regiments of the ROK 3rd Division, which held a defensive position on the hills bordering the west side of the valley south of the airfield.

[26] The airfield itself had not been used since the middle of August except for emergency landing and refueling of planes, but evacuation of USAF equipment, bombs, and petroleum products was still in progress.

[40] The next morning, September 11, the 19th Infantry passed through the left-hand ROK regiment just south of Hill 131 and, with the 1st Battalion leading, attacked west.

[41] North and South Korean forces suffered heavily in the battle, each side inflicted large numbers of casualties on one another.

The KPA system of supply could not resolve the problems of logistics and communication necessary to support and exploit an offensive operation in this sector of the front.