[8] Starting from 1983, Vietnamese border raids in Thailand increased as Vietnam aimed to eliminate the remnants of the Khmer Rouge forces who fled there.

[8] China had pledged support to the resistance fighters and in February 1983, Yang Dezhi of the People's Liberation Army General (PLA) Staff Department visited Thailand promising to provide aid should they ever be attacked by Vietnam.

[9] Sihanouk requested help from Deng as Vietnam forces were continuing to attack resistance group positions.

[9] As a result of its previous pledges, China planned to attack Laoshan to relieve Vietnamese pressure on resistance forces.

[9] Laoshan is a range of hills located on the China–Vietnam border between Malipo County, Yunnan and Vị Xuyên, Hà Giang.

One view was that since it was also challenging to reach from Hanoi, attacking it could divert many PAVN troops away from other regions, or even capture the provincial capital itself – a major psychological blow.

[7] The largest of them took place in Tràng Định District, Lạng Sơn Province, with several Chinese battalions assaulting Hills 820 and 636 near the routes taken during the 1979 invasion at the Friendship Gate.

[7][13] Chinese documents later revealed that the ground attacks primarily served the diversionary objective, with their scales much lower than that reported by Western sources.

PLA troops captured the hamlet of Na La, as well as Hills 233, 685 and 468, creating a salient of 2.5 km thrusting into Vietnam.

[15][16] In roughly the same timeframe, the PLA conducted a similar operation on Zheyinshan, a nearby hill range east of Laoshan.

[17] Factors such as bad timing, not considering terrain conditions and lack of flexibility between subordinates and officers lead to the assault being behind schedule with losses exceeding expectations.

[17] However unlike Laoshan, the performance for Zheyinshan was much better as the commanders allowed more flexibility and postponed the attack by an hour to let troops rest longer after heavy rain delays .

[19][20] Military leader such as Lê Trọng Tấn, Le Ngoc Hien and Vũ Lập gathered at Hà Giang to come up with a plan.

PLA forces were strengthened but the defensive positions were changed so there were fewer troops in key locations with the rest kept behind lines ready to provide replenishment.

[22] Nonetheless, the attack reportedly alarmed Deng Xiaoping, who ordered reconnaissance units to be deployed extensively.

[6] This allowed PLA to locate hidden or resting PAVN soldiers under darkness as a cover and fire artillery on their positions.

Along the 11-kilometer border segment, the deepest Chinese intrusion was made at Hills 685 and 468 located approximately 2 km to the south.

From 1984 to 1989, there were a total of five rotations involving the military command regions Nanjing, Jinan, Lanzhou, Beijing, and Chengdu.