Guoguang was initiated in 1961 in response to events involving the PRC, particularly the Great Leap Forward, the Sino-Soviet split, and the development of nuclear weapons.
The use of a large scale invasion as the initial stage of reunification was effectively abandoned after 1966, although the Guoguang planning organization was not abolished until 1972.
[9][6] From 1951 to 1954, the ROC's irregular Anti-Communist Salvation Army — trained by the US Central Intelligence Agency — raided the PRC coast from ROC-controlled islands near the mainland.
[5] Other options that were considered were a regional campaign on the PRC-Myanmar border,[9] and guerrilla involvement in the Vietnam War as a supporting diversion for a ROC invasion across the Taiwan Strait.
Project Guoguang later identified that the ideal time to attack was when the PRC was embroiled in political strife, or at war with rebels or neighbouring countries.
[11][12] The ROCAF created a staff, the Guoguang Operation Office,[9] that was the primary supervisory body for invasion planning and preparations;[13] it was led by a lieutenant general and reported directly to Chiang Kai-shek.
[17] However, the US opposed the resumption of warfare in China; it communicated this through diplomatic channels,[10][12] and by overtly surveilling the ROC's preparations through the Military Assistance Advisory Group.
[17] Chiang Kai-shek decided to proceed without US approval following the PRC's first successful nuclear weapon test in October 1964; on 17 June 1965, he notified officers at a meeting at the ROC Military Academy that the invasion was imminent.
[14] In November at the Battle of East Chongwu, the ROCN warships Shan Hai and Lin Huai were intercepted by the PLAN while en route the islands of Magong and Wuqiu to pick up wounded troops.
The offer was rejected as the US was then attempting to limit the war and did not want to expand the conflict (at this time intervention in Cambodia and Laos was not US policy).
[12] The start of the PRC's Cultural Revolution in 1966 prompted the ROC to review its plans in anticipation of exploiting unrest on the mainland.
[19] Chiang Ching-kuo believed that success required a popular and armed anti-Communist revolution ("Hungary-style") in the PRC — which an ROC invasion could then support — and significant changes to the international environment.
The Nixon Doctrine[19][21] and announcement of the withdrawal of US troops from Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué[13] demanded that the ROC pay more attention to defense.
[21][23] For a time, the ROC may have abandoned the expectation of mounting a large scale attack on the PRC; the Operation Planning Office was abolished on 20 July 1972.
He immediately abandoned the policy of pursuing the reunification of China through force,[25] which allowed the ROCAF to adopt a fully defensive posture starting in 1991.