[1] Sheremetev's major tactical error was to advance relying on outdated and sparse intelligence reports, and without adequate scouting.

[citation needed] The Polish commanders Hetmans Potocki and Lubomirski had much better intelligence (they were also aided by Ivan Vyhovsky spy network) and quickly became aware of Sheremetev's error.

[citation needed] The combined Polish army (not counting 12,000 Tatars and 1,500 Cossacks under Vyhovsky) numbered about 27,000 (including about 700 Winged Hussars, 8,000 pancerni, 3500 light cavalry, 1,500 raitars, 5,000 dragoons, and 10,000 infantry).

[1] Sheremetev troops (not counting about 15,000 Cossacks under Tsetsura) numbered 18,000 (including 4500 Russian traditional cavalry, 5,500 raitars, 3,500 dragoons, 3,000 foreign infantry and 1,000 streltsy).

Sheremetev, who had up until then failed to send out a single scouting party, suddenly realized what was to be an easy victory was a death trap and decided to take a defensive position in a fortified camp.