Many thieves at Mogadishu's sea and airport, the main supply hub, were linked to the rebel forces of Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aidid but were effectively demobilized following the rout of the SNF.

With militia leaders lacking funds and Barre's forces no longer presenting a unifying threat and, Aidid and Mahdi increasingly lost control over many young fighters, as did clan elders.

[43] By November 1992, largely owing to the mediation efforts of Mohamed Sahnoun, aid was flowing through the Mogadishu port unimpeded, with theft and banditry on the routes to famine zones averaging around 20%.

[47] The United Nations' intervention, backed by U.S. Marines, has been credited with helping end the famine in Somalia, though the starvation had been improving in the worst-affected areas before troops arrived[50][51] and had the effect of speeding the conclusion of the crisis by about a month.

[61] Professor Ioan M. Lewis asserts that the UN made an unwise choice to resort to military force, which led to substantial Somali casualties, rather than attempting to politically isolate Aidid and launch an independent legal inquiry.

[70] Former Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Ramesh Thakur, observed that, "The scale, intensity, and frequency of the use of force by UNOSOM after June 1993 bore little resemblance to the rhetoric and expectations of when it was established, nor any recognizable relationship by then to a peacekeeping operation as defined in the UN lexicon.

[81] Notable groups and organizations such as the Vatican, the Organisation of African Unity, World Vision, Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International called for UNOSOM to review it policies and course.

[95] Further criticism of the raid came from numerous contributing states,[96] most notably the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led war.

This shift was signaled by Defense Secretary Les Aspin in his 27 August speech, advocating for a decreased military focus in UNOSOM II and urging the UN and the OAU to resume negotiations with all parties.

Most of the fighters who participated belonged to the Somali National Alliance, drawing largely from Aidids Habar Gidir sub-clan of the Hawiye, who began fighting U.S. troops following the Abdi House raid of 12 July 1993.

[138][140] Many of the tactics Aidid, Giumale and other subordinate SNA commanders drew on were inspired by Chinese and Vietnamese books on guerrilla warfare and on advice from Somali mujahedeen veterans, who had just returned from the Soviet–Afghan War.

[90][91][142] In the days preceding the battle, Somali anger against UNOSOM troops was stoked when American mortar crews had fired shells into the dense neighborhoods surrounding their base, killing a family of eight and injuring 34.

[146] On the morning of 3 October 1993, a locally recruited intelligence asset reported to the CIA that two of Aidid's principal advisors in the SNA, Omar Salad Elmi and Abdi Hassan Awale, would be meeting near the Olympic Hotel (2°03′04.1″N 45°19′28.9″E / 2.051139°N 45.324694°E / 2.051139; 45.324694 (Target)).

[138] Col. Sharif Hassan Giumale had carefully analyzed Task Force Ranger's previous six operations in Mogadishu and attempted to apply lessons from the civil war and from his extensive reading on guerrilla insurgencies, particularly the FLMN in El Salvador, who had developed anti-aircraft tactics with infantry weapons.

[138][139] Knowing U.S. special forces considered themselves elite, Giumale believed that they were hubristically underrating the tactical capacity of SNA fighters, who had months of urban fighting experience in the streets of Mogadishu.

According to high ranking Somali National Alliance officials, 10 minutes of general confusion followed the arrival of the Black Hawks,[155] but after getting a basic understanding of the situation, SNA Col. Sharif Hassan Giumale gave out the order over radio to officers across Mogadishu to start converging on the site of the battle and to begin organizing ambushes along likely reinforcement routes from the UNOSOM bases.

[138][144]The ground-extraction convoy was supposed to reach the captive targets a few minutes after the operation's beginning, but it was impeded by Somali citizens and local militia who formed barricades along Mogadishu's streets with rocks, wreckage, rubbish and burning tires.

The pilot, CW3 Karl Maier, steadied the controls in his left hand and fired a machine gun with his right, while the copilot, CW4 Keith Jones, dashed into the alley and helped the two Delta snipers, one of them mortally wounded, into the back of their helicopter.

[144] At 6:40 p.m., Col. Sharif Hassan Giumale, in charge of managing the majority of the Somali forces on the ground, received written instruction from Aidid to repel any reinforcements and take all measures necessary to prevent the Americans from escaping.

[138] American officers who were later made privy Giumale's decision conceded that the presence of the civilians prevented an attack, but disputed the notion that the mortars were powerful enough to wipe out Task Force Ranger.

[144] Though Mohamed Farah Aidid had hours earlier given the order to Colonel Sharif Hassan Giumale to prevent the escape of any American soldiers, he had begun to become increasingly concerned with the mounting Somali death toll and the prospect of inviting a large scale retaliation if the remaining U.S. troops holding out were killed.

The relief column that ultimately extracted TF Ranger had to fight its way into and out of the Bakara Market; SNA fighters were resisting fiercely until UN forces crossed out of Aideed's zone of control and withdrew to their bases.

[167] In the last few panicked minutes of the battle, with the convoy operating in a long column with staggered stops and starts, some vehicles ended up making a dash to Mogadishu Stadium, accidentally leaving behind soldiers and forcing them to trek on foot.

[138][144] After the battle, the bodies of several of the conflict's U.S. casualties (Black Hawk Super 64's crewmembers and their defenders, Delta Force soldiers MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart) were dragged through Mogadishu's streets by a large crowd of Somalis.

"[169] Several days after the incident, the SNA issued a public appeal, stating that despite the "wanton destruction and suffering beyond human comprehension" inflicted by UNOSOM II and US forces, the alliance urged respect towards the deceased, injured, and prisoners of war; in accordance with Islamic principles.

[79] The non-SNA volunteers, mostly untrained civilians turned combatant with grievances against UNOSOM troops, were a significant issue for Somali National Alliance commanders as they complicated situation on the ground and often got themselves killed with their inexperience.

"[211] In a national security policy review session held in the White House on 6 October 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, to stop all actions by U.S. forces against Aidid except those required in self-defense.

In the same interview, he stated that, at the time, there was "not a living soul in the world who thought that Osama bin Laden had anything to do with Black Hawk down or was paying any attention to it or even knew al-Qaeda was a growing concern in October of '93", and that the mission was strictly humanitarian.

[233] Fear of a repeat of the events in Somalia shaped U.S. policy in subsequent years, with many commentators identifying the Battle of Mogadishu's graphic consequences as the key reason behind the U.S.'s decision to not intervene in later conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

[255] In August 2013, remains of Super 61, consisting of the mostly intact main rotor and parts of the nose section, were extracted from the crash site and returned to the United States through the efforts of David Snelson and Alisha Ryu.