[19] Though casualties on both sides were heavy, the Red Army forces were able to break through the hastily organized Japanese defenses and capture the city ten days ahead of schedule.

[2] In February 1945 at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan within three months of Germany's defeat.

To meet that deadline, the Soviet Union and the Western Allies co-operated in stockpiling supplies in the Far East,[20] and the Red Army dispatched additional forces along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The overall strategy in the event of a Soviet attack was for an initial stand to be made near the borders to allow the main Kwantung Army forces to withdraw to a "redoubt area" around the city of Tunghua.

The Soviets continued to gain ground, but the shrinking Japanese lines and their recovery from the initial attack meant that resistance in all sectors was stiffening.

During the struggle for Mount Shozu, an important Japanese stronghold, the weight of Soviet fire was so great that it appeared as if the top of the mountain had been blown completely off.

Rocket artillery pulverized the remaining Japanese defenders, while tanks and infantry rushed forward to attack the city itself.

However, in attempting to cross the Mudan River to the east of Mutanchiang, the 1st Red Banner Army found that all three bridges spanning it had been destroyed by the Japanese, and heavy fire from the opposite bank made a landing by boat impossible.

[35] In response, the Soviet 22nd Rifle Division crossed the river farther to the north and surprised the Japanese defenders from behind, which forced their withdrawal.

[35] Shortly afterward, the main strength of the Kwantung Army laid down its arms in obedience to Emperor Hirohito's surrender broadcast.

Through the speed and the audacious conduct of their offensive, the Soviet 5th and 1st Red Banner Armies won a major victory at Mutanchiang, advanced 150-180 km, and captured the objective fully ten days ahead of schedule.

[37] Despite those successes, however, stiff Japanese resistance and the failure of the main Soviet forces to keep pace with their spearheads allowed the bulk of the IJA 5th Army to withdraw, albeit at only 50% of its already-substandard effectiveness.

Those claims may actually have been an underestimate:[2] Soviet calculations place the 1st Far Eastern Front's losses in the Manchurian campaign as 21,069, including 6,324 killed, captured, or missing and 14,745 wounded and sick.