He joined the Bolsheviks (later the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in August 1917, and became chief of staff of Red Guard militia that helped to organise in the town.

[1] From 1922, he held a number of commands as chief of staff, first in a cavalry division, later in various armies and military districts.

From September 1936 to May 1937, Meretskov fought for the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War under a pseudonym of "General Pavlovich".

[3] However, gross underestimations of the Finnish defenses, the size of their forces and the corresponding overestimations of the capacity of the Red Army, led to serious planning flaws.

Only five rifle divisions were initially sent to assault the Mannerheim Line and piecemeal commitment of reinforcements did not achieve any effect.

Less than two weeks after the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, on March 21, 1940, Meretskov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

"[9] On June 22, 1941, when Operation Barbarossa started, Meretskov was appointed permanent adviser to Stavka.

Mark Solonin, in his book June the 25th: Stupidity or Aggression, proposes a theory that the actual reason might have been Meretskov's skepticism about the need to start bombardments of Finland, and his later release was due to him turning out to have been right, although he admits that direct evidence is unlikely to be found.

[12] According to Nikita Khrushchev, "before his arrest, Meretskov had been a strapping young general, very strong and impressive-looking.

[14] During the counteroffensive of the battle, Stavka ordered Kirill Meretskov to organize a new Volkhov Front, which he commanded until February 1944 (with the exception of May and June 1942).

[1] In January 1942, Meretskov started a new offensive near Lyuban, aimed at lifting the siege of Leningrad and encircling a large number of German forces.

However, when Meretskov reported this to the Stavka, he omitted that the corridor that was linking the 2nd Shock Army to the rest of the Soviet forces was no more than 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) wide, under constant German air strikes and artillery bombardment, and therefore, had a very poor transport capacity.

[18] Immediately after the battle, Meretskov placed the blame on the captured 2nd Shock Army commander, Andrey Vlasov, whom he himself recommended to the post in April, a claim that was echoed in his post-war memoirs.

[20] Meretskov, who was arrested less than a year earlier, knew that his life may be at risk if he accepted responsibility for the disaster.

Together with the new Leningrad Front's commander, Leonid Govorov, Meretskov planned a new offensive to break the siege of the city.

As a result, the Soviet Sinyavino Offensive failed and the 2nd Shock army was decimated for the second time in a year, but the German forces suffered heavy casualties and canceled Operation Northern Light.

This operation had the aim of decisively defeating Army Group North, but achieved very modest gains.

[27] Several other offensives were conducted by Meretskov in the area in 1943, slowly expanding the corridor, and making other small gains.

[28] In November 1943, Meretskov and Govorov began planning the Leningrad-Novgorod Offensive which would drive Army Group North out of the Leningrad region.

By March 1, the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic Fronts had driven Army Group North back up to 300 kilometres (190 mi) on a 400 kilometres (250 mi) front, liberating the southern Leningrad region and part of the Kalinin region.

According to the plan, the main force of the 1st Far East Front Army of set out from Primorsky Krai, broke through the Japanese defense line set up in the East Manchuria, and carried out assaults against the Kwantung Army in Jilin, in order to compete with Marshal Rodion Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front.

The Japanese headquarters completely lost command of the team and did not organize strong resistance until August 15.

After August 15, the Japanese tried to organize heavy resistance in Mudanjiang, but they still could not stop the advancement of Meretskov's 1st Far East Front Army.

On the 18th, the commander of the Kwantung Army Otozō Yamada did not reply to Meretskov's telegram requesting him to surrender.

At the end of August, he went to the Chinese brigade inspection training led by Zhou Baozhong and asked his subordinates to provide the report of the North Korean battalion commander by future leader of North Korea Kim Il Sung.