[2] From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the KPA used these tactics to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south.

[4] Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union, the North Koreans were aware of the UN forces building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that they must conduct an offensive soon or they could not win the battle.

[20] The 6th Division, farthest south on the right flank, was to attack through Haman, Masan, and Chinhae and then capture Kumhae, on the west side of the Naktong River delta 15 miles (24 km) from Pusan, by September 3.

[20] As a part of this plan, the KPA 6th Division had been engaging the 24th Infantry at Battle Mountain for several weeks prior, with no gains for either side.

[17] At 23:30 on August 31, a KPA SU-76 self-propelled high-velocity gun from across the Nam fired shells into the position of G Company, 35th Infantry, overlooking the river.

[21][24] Under cover of this fire a reinforced regiment of the KPA 7th Division crossed the Nam River and attacked F and G Companies, 35th Infantry.

[25] Other KPA soldiers crossed the Nam on an underwater bridge in front of the paddy ground north of Komam-ni and near the boundary between the 2nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Wilkins, Jr., holding the river front and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion holding the hill line that stretched from the Nam River to Sibidang-san and the Chinju-Masan highway.

[26] At the river ferry crossing site in the low ground between these two battalions, the regimental commander placed 300 ROK National Police, expecting them to hold there long enough to serve as a warning for the rest of the forces.

[27] Elements of C and D Companies formed a defense line along the dike at the north edge of Komam-ni where US tanks joined them at dawn.

The KPA, however, did not drive for the Komam-ni road fork 4 miles (6.4 km) south of the river as the US commander, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Fisher had expected; instead, they turned east into the hills behind 2nd Battalion.

Daylight revealed a vast amount of abandoned KPA equipment scattered on the slope just below the crest, including 33 machine-guns.

[29] In the meantime, the KPA 6th Division had made breakthroughs in the US 24th Infantry sector to the south, overwhelming the regiment and forcing it back.

These two avenues of approach, the Komam-ni-Masan highway and the Chirwon road converging at Chung-ni, formed the axes of their attack plan.

[33] US Engineer troops counterattacking up the secondary road toward Chirwon during September 1 made slow progress, and the KPA stopped them in the early afternoon.

[34] During the morning hours of September 1, when the KPA 7th Division troops had attacked, the first American unit they encountered was G Company, 35th Infantry, at the north shoulder of the gap.

[27] After daylight, Captain LeRoy E. Majeske, G Company commander, requested artillery concentrations and air strikes, but they were slow to come.

A few minutes later Majeske was killed, and Second Lieutenant George Roach, commanding the 3rd Platoon, again reported the situation and asked for an air strike.

In this attack the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, killed 275 KPA and recovered a large part of the equipment G Company had lost earlier.

[37] By evening it had cleared the supply road and adjacent terrain of KPA penetration for a distance of 8,000 yards (7,300 m) to the rear of G Company's front-line positions.

To meet this new situation, General Kean ordered the remaining battalion of the 27th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George H. DeChow, to attack and destroy the KPA operating there.

[38][39] After an early morning struggle on September 3 against several hundred KPA in the vicinity of the artillery positions, DeChow's battalion launched its attack at 15:00 over the high, rugged terrain west of the "Horseshoe," as the deep curve in the Masan road was called, 4 miles (6.4 km) east of Komam-ni.

After the battalion advanced some distance, a KPA force, estimated to number more than 1,000 men, counterattacked it and inflicted heavy casualties, which included 13 officers.

In the afternoon, heavy rains slowed the attack, but after an all-day battle, I and K Companies, with the help of numerous air strikes, captured the high ground dominating the Komam-ni crossroads.

Behind its positions on Sibidang-san the main supply route and rear areas were in KPA hands, and only in daylight and under escort could vehicles travel the road.

[41] On Sibidang-san the battalion had held its original positions after the heavy fighting of September 1, completely surrounded by barbed wire, booby traps, and flares, with all supporting weapons inside its tight perimeters.

Eighth Army commander General Walton S. Walker attributed the UN victory in this sector directly to the extensive air support his division received in the battle.

[44] Battalions, companies, and platoons, cut off and isolated, fought independently of higher control and help except for airdrops which supplied many of them.

Tanks and armored cars drove to the isolated units with supplies of food and ammunition and carried back critically wounded on the return trips.

He therefore believed that the key to the advance of the 25th Division lay in its center where the KPA held the heights and kept the 24th Infantry Regiment under daily attack.

[53] The battle itself was a tactical tie, since neither side could decisively defeat the other, however the UN units achieved their strategic goal of preventing the KPA from advancing further east and threatening Pusan.