At the end of the 18th century, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti was the object of frequent attacks by the Persian and Ottoman empires, as well as systematic raids by North Caucasian mountaineers.

At the same time, within the kingdom itself, there was internecine struggle among the reigning Bagrationi dynasty, which took a special turn after the death in 1798 of King Heraclius II and the accession to the throne of his son from his second marriage, George XII.

[8] Having lost hope for Russia, in the same year George secretly sent Prince Aslan-Orbeliani to the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid I with a petition to accept Georgia under the patronage of the Porte.

Minister Plenipotentiary and State Counsellor Kovalensky, who was there, sent letters to Tehran in which he expressed his hopes for the preservation of friendly relations between the two powers, and, referring to the treaty of 1783, warned against the invasion of Persian troops in Georgia.

The ambassadors insisted on a secret audience with the King, but George refused them and received them in the house of Kovalensky in the presence of Lazarev and all the officers of the Jaeger regiment.

[20][21] Immediately after this became known in St. Petersburg, the head of the Caucasian division, Lieutenant General Karl Knorring, received an order on 10 July to prepare to send 9 battalions of infantry, 10 squadrons of dragoons, and artillery to Georgia.

[26][27] As early as the beginning of August 1800, his ambassador, Hadji Musa, arrived in Mozdok from Umma Khan with a request addressed to Emperor Paul to accept the Avar Khanate under the patronage of Russia.

The rest of the army was divided into two groups: one was to go directly to Tbilisi and try to capture it, while the other was to cross the river Kura (on the right bank) and join the troops of Imeretian King Solomon II, along with the opposition brothers of George—Iulon, Vakhtang, and Parnaoz.

[30][31] In mid-October, Umma Khan sent a letter to the Georgian prince David, explaining that his "hostile" actions against Georgia were a result of George's failure to pay the tribute owed to him.

[32] Upon receiving the first reports of Umma Khan's movement, George sent his sons Ioane and Bagrat with 2,000 of the best Georgian troops to the Kakhetian border at Signagi, located 85 kilometers from Tbilisi.

Lazarev, however, initially downplayed the significance of Umma Khan's advance, believing that the latter was unaware of the retreat of the Persian forces and the arrival of a Jaeger Musketeer Regiment in Tbilisi to reinforce him.

But soon, after learning of Umma Khan's plans, Lazarev and Gulyakov, each leading a battalion from his regiment along with a Cossack detachment (1,224 men and 4 guns), set out to confront him on October 28.

On October 31, Umma Khan crossed to the left bank of the Alazani River at the Urdo ford and positioned his army on the plain near the Top-Karagach tract, about 16 miles from Signagi.

[35] In response, Umma Khan assured Lazarev that he harbored no “hostility” toward Russia, “except for united friendship,” but, having hosted Prince Alexander, he felt it his duty to assist him.

[39][40] Meanwhile, Umma Khan, having instructed his troops to avoid direct confrontation with the Russian detachment, bypassed his camp on the night of 6 November and moved toward Sagarejo.

Ali-Sultan of Mehtuli, his brother Haji-Ahmed-khan of Dzhengutay, Musa-Haji of Aksay, Qadi of Tabasaran Kazi-Mulla, the son of Surkhay II of Gazikumukh, and other Dagestani rulers joined Umma Khan (under his command).

[56] 20,000 (invaded, citing George XII)[62] On 7 November, three hours before dawn, the Russian-Georgian army left the bivouac and, after a forced march of 15 miles, stopped for a short rest.

[64][63] There is an opinion that the Georgian cavalry, which opened fire on them from the left bank of the Iori River, provoked the attack by the mountaineers (despite Umma Khan's ban).

[66] The nobleman Turmanidze, who was with Prince Alexander in the camp of Umma Khan at that time, later testified during interrogation that at the military council it was decided to postpone the attack until the morning and begin it at dawn.

[68] There was a dilapidated tower on the edge of a steep hillside along which Guliakov's column was marching, and a Lezgin who had lodged in it killed a private musketeer with a signal shot.

[69] The Russian artillery fired a volley, but according to Lazarev's report, "the first receptions, although they caused quite a lot of concern for the enemy's ears, did not produce any noticeable change in him, probably because they had not yet reached their crowd".

[43] A part of the Dagestani infantry, which had crossed to the left bank of the Iori by that time, also rushed at the cavalry of the Jaeger battalion, opening rifle fire at it from a long distance.

[73] Unable to pass Lazarev's Jaeger square on the way back, the Dagestani cavalry was once again subjected to artillery and rifle fire, suffering additional losses.

[63][74][75] Based on oral and written sources of local origin, the Avar scholar and theologian Haydarbek Genichutlinsky provided a slightly different account of the battle.

Realizing they had nowhere left to flee and convinced that inevitable destruction awaited them, the Russians took shelter in a defensible position and resolved to fight as long as they had strength and opportunity.

The latter also urged George XII to join their coalition, proposing that their combined forces should encircle and finally defeat the enemy, so that "none of the Lezgins would dare to come here" afterward.

The Consul General in Persia, Skibinevsky, reported to Knorring that, upon learning of the Russian victory in Georgia over Umma Khan, Fath-Ali Shah abandoned his plans to march there and instead turned his attention to Khorasan.

They believed that if Georgia lost the hope of coming under Russia's protection, it would undoubtedly fall under the dominion of either the Persians or the Turks, or be destroyed by predatory highlanders.

[90] The consequence of the victory at Niakhura was Russia's acquisition of immense popularity in Georgia,[91] the demonstration of its military power in the Caucasus region, and the importance of its patronage.

<...> The faith of the population of Gurjistan [Georgia] and other people in the courage and valor of the victorious Russian troops greatly increased, for it was one of the rare and difficult cases.