[6] An Anglo-Dutch army met a Spanish force head-on which, although their left flank nearly broke, were able to assail them with both infantry and cavalry.

Exacerbated by Albert's policy to promote bloodline over merit and to break up new regiments to reinforce older, mutiny had become commonplace.

Chief among those was the brand new and very strong fort Crevecoeur (north of 's-Hertogenbosch, part of previous year's ambitious plans).

For this operation, by 21 June Maurice had collected an army of twelve infantry regiments and 25 troops of cavalry: some 12,000 Foot and 2,000 Horse.

The following day he crossed the Scheldt Estuary in a multitude of small vessels and moved to Ostend, his base of operations; there he left a half regiment and four troops to reinforce the garrison and, on 30 June, started for Nieuwpoort.

That night, while he was making preparations for a regular siege, he received news that the Archduke was close at hand with a field army; knowing that he was cut off from his base, he ordered his cousin Ernst Casimir (Ernst Casimir I of Nassau-Dietz) to delay with a force the advancing Spanish troops, while he was bringing the best part of his army to cross again the Yser and rejoin the rest, to face the Archduke: he had no option left but to present battle, or risk a potentially disastrous retreat by sea.

Ernst Casimir - commanding the Edmonds (Scottish) and the Van der Noot (Dutch) regiments, together with four troops of cavalry and two guns - was ordered to seize the Leffinghen bridge but, as he arrived, he found the Spanish already in its possession; Ernst deployed his force behind a ditch, hoping to fight a delaying action, but the Spaniards were already in great strength across the bridge and charged right home, piercing his centre routing the infantry at once while his cavalry fled in panic.

The army therefore advanced in battle order along the coast; it was midday and the tide was coming in, so that in the end they were forced to abandon the shrinking beach and climb slowly up the slippery dunes.

Maurice had posted his best regiments in a strong defensive position on top of a stretch of dunes, with guns covering both flanks with enfilade fire.

[10] The Spanish sent a screen of 500 harquebusiers to cover their advance; but soon the two unruly mutineer regiments in the vanguard started the attack with a rash charge up the hill.

The Sapena and Ávila Tercios made quick progress against the Frisian regiment on the Dutch right, and Maurice sent his entire second line to protect that sector, stabilising the front.

Meanwhile offshore an Anglo-Dutch fleet had moved close to the shore and bombarded the Spanish positions supporting the land forces.

Meanwhile, on the Dutch left, the English regiments faced the veteran tercios of Monroy and Villar; the elite of the Spanish infantry.

The English, well drilled in Maurice's new tactics, kept a rolling fire on the Spaniards who advanced up the slope at a steady pace, covered by a screen of skirmisher harquebusiers.

Vere, who had been able to rally some English companies behind a battery, joined the fight, and he was reinforced by the regiments in the third line that had finally arrived.

The Spanish infantry, already engaged at the front, was this time unable to repulse the attack on their flank and started to give ground.

The survivors scattered in all directions, but the inactivity of the Dutch garrison in Ostend allowed the Spanish army to avoid total destruction.

British forces who bore the brunt of the Spanish attack suffered heavy losses of nearly 600 men, but was proof to the Dutch of their reliability in battle.

[17] Strategically, the lesson drawn from this battle was that it was more advantageous to besiege and capture towns than to attempt to win in the open field.

[18] News of the victory reached England; Elizabeth I was overjoyed - she repeatably said to her courtiers that Vere was, 'the worthiest captain of our time'.