General Lieutenant Baron Fersen fought for several months in Poland but was also joined by fresh reinforcements sent from Russia.

[21][22] That is, the forces may have been roughly equal overall, however, largely due to the declining morale of the Varsovians, they put up just 2,000 men — irregular soldiers — to defend the ramparts.

The main force, the regular troops, stood behind fortifications as a reserve on the vast field according to Kościuszko's plan.

[23] After a reconnaissance by the Russian side, up to 24,055 men, inclusive of 41 infantry battalions and 81 cavalry squadrons, would come out for the storming together with reserve units;[22] in the village of Okuniew a wagenburg was stationed.

[24] The Russian forces reached the outskirts of Warsaw on 2 November 1794, pushing back Polish-Lithuanian outposts with bayonets, launching the reconnaissance and declaring the disposition.

This made Józef Zajączek think that the opposing forces were preparing for a long stay there; the Russians disguised the forthcoming attack in order to give the rebels reason to expect a siege.

[21][1][8] At 3 o'clock in the morning of November 4, the Russian troops silently reached the positions just outside the outer rim of the field fortifications.

First and second columns began preparations; besides, the Polish general fatigue and the low spirits of their leaders contributed to the fact that the Russian advance was noticed too late.

The Polish cavalry could easily hold Lacy in the open field behind the rampart, and the infantry in the narrow passage between the Vistula and the buildings; but it failed.

Prime Major Markov with the first battalion of the Apsheron Regiment climbed up the assault ladders on the rampart, hit the Poles from here with jaeger rifle fire, then broke into the fortress, drove the enemy in front of him, and took possession of the battery.

[30][28] Heavy artillery fire from the batteries, then from the cavalier, and rifle fire from behind the line of abatises entailed heavy losses, but the Russians did not stop; The Second Major Kharlamov of the Azov Regiment crossed the trous de loup and ditch, beat back two cannon, "through which he gave the whole column a way to go"; near the menagerie there was a fierce melee, which forced Buxhoeveden to divide the column into parts to facilitate the attack on the menagerie's vast park.

[31][33][28] General Major Denisov [ru] with the seventh column still at night occupied the Las village in front of the fortifications of Lieutenant Colonel Jabłonowski.

Having cut off the Poles' retreat; Denisov drove them to a spit, in the corner between the Vistula and a swampy channel; the cannons of Captain Rezvoy's artillery pierced through his enemy's crowd thickly huddled on the spit; the extermination was merciless; the Poles, seeking escape, threw themselves into the Vistula and perished in great numbers.

And on the opposite bank of the Vistula, only half a kilometre (0.3 mi), the inhabitants of Warsaw were gathered, and their brethren perished before their eyes.

[34][28] According to Denisov's testimony, the Poles lost 1,218 men killed, several hundred drowned, 16 cannons, and 3 artillery caissons; Jabłonowski himself and 1,300 officers and lower ranks were taken prisoner.

It was dawning; the day was quiet and clear, the sun was shining and illuminating the bloodshed that was taking place in the suburb; the Russian jaegers were entering the bridge, and the Polish commander-in-chief was horrified,—what a terrible and near danger threatened the capital!

[37] Suvorov himself was on a hill, a kilometre (0.6 mi) from the Polish fortifications at Piaskowa Góra, i.e. he was approximately in the middle of the line of his troops, which facilitated the task of monitoring and controlling the battle course.

By the speed with which the Russians appeared at the fortifications and moved forward, as well as by the reports of orderlies and chiefs, he saw that the troops fought not only with special energy, but also with extreme fierceness.

[35][37] Thus, the defenders were completely surprised and shortly thereafter the defence lines were broken into several isolated pockets of resistance, bombarded by the Russians with canister shots with a devastating effect.

Joselewicz survived, being severely wounded,[citation needed] but almost all of his command was annihilated; Jasiński was killed fighting bravely on the front line.

[1] Faddey Bulgarin recalled the words of General Ivan von Klugen, who took part in the Battle of Praga, "We were being shot at from the windows of houses and the roofs, and our soldiers were breaking into the houses and killing all who happened to get in the way… In every living being our embittered soldiers saw the murderer of our men during the uprising in Warsaw… It cost a lot of effort for the Russian officers to save these poor people from the revenge of our soldiers… At four o'clock the terrible revenge for the slaughter of our men in Warsaw was complete!

The exact death toll of that day remains unknown, but it is estimated that up to 20,000 people were killed,[4][42] including military, armed and unarmed inhabitants.

[45] Russian historians (e.g., Boris Kipnis [ru]) state that Suvorov tried to stop the massacre by ordering the destruction of the bridge to Warsaw over the Vistula river with the purpose of preventing the spread of violence to the capital,[1][46] although Polish historians dispute this, pointing out to purely military considerations of this move, such as to stop Polish and Lithuanian troops stationing on the left bank from attacking Russian soldiers.

To spare Warsaw the fate of its eastern suburb, General Tomasz Wawrzecki decided to withdraw his remaining forces southwards and on November 5.

[47] On the other hand Polish literature and historiography has a tendency to be biased in the other direction, dwelling on the description of Russian cruelty and barbarism.

[47] Similar arguments were used by Russian historians Pyotr Chaadayev, Anton Kozachenko [uk] and even Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and can be seen repeated in the Soviet-era reference works as the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.