Battle of San Carlos (1982)

The location was chosen as the landing force would be protected by the terrain against Exocet and submarine attacks, and it was distant enough from Stanley to prevent a rapid reaction from Argentine ground troops stationed there.

Following the sinking of the Belgrano, the Navy's carrier-borne force of 8 A-4Qs was based at Río Grande naval airbase where they were joined by two refurbished aircraft of the same type.

[8] The FAA units deployed to southern Argentina during the war were regrouped under a command known as Fuerza Aerea Sur (English: South Air Force), or FAS, led by Brigadier-General Ernesto Crespo.

[10] Near Stanley the Argentinians deployed a long-range Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 radar that proved capable of detecting British aircraft at distances up to 40 miles.

[11] This is a list of the main sorties carried out by Argentine air units showing approximate local time, aircraft and call sign.

An outpost with two 81mm mortars and two recoilless 105mm rifles was established on Fanning Head, in order to watch for amphibious landings and control the entrance to the Sound.

[13] On the night of the British landings, 19 men under 2nd Lieutenant Roberto Reyes were manning the outpost, while Esteban and the remainder of the unit were stationed in Port San Carlos settlement.

[14] The British fleet entered San Carlos during the night and at 02:50 was spotted by EC Güemes which opened fire with 81mm mortars and two recoilless 105mm rifles.

They were soon engaged by British naval gunfire and a 25-man SBS team; forced to retreat, they lost their communications equipment; but they shot down two Gazelle helicopters with small-arms fire, killing three members of the two aircrews.

Evans and the other crewman, Sergeant Edward Candlish, were thrown out of the aircraft, and Argentine troops shot at them for about 15 minutes as they struggled in the water, ignoring orders from their commanding officer to cease fire.

Minutes later, a second British Gazelle helicopter, following the same route as the first, was raked by machine-gun fire from the Argentine platoon and shot down, killing the crew, Lt. Ken Francis and L/Cpl.

[15] 1st Lt Carlos Daniel Esteban from EC Güemes informed Goose Green garrison about the landings at 08:22 (he was finally evacuated by helicopter on 26 May).

[17] Bad weather over the Patagonia airfields prevented the Argentines from carrying out most of their air missions; only a few Skyhawks managed to reach the islands.

On 24 May the Argentine pilots on the continent openly expressed their concern about the lack of collaboration between the three branches of the armed forces, and protested with passive resistance.

Attacks on HMS Broadsword damaged the frigate's communication systems and hydraulics and shattered the nose of her Sea Lynx helicopter.

One sortie accidentally attacked Goose Green, mistaking it for Ajax Bay, and was hit by small arms friendly fire.

800 NAS Sea Harrier FRS1 from HMS Hermes
Argentine airbases: Distances to Port Stanley Airport : [ 12 ] Trelew: 580 nautical miles (1,070 km), Comodoro Rivadavia: 480 nautical miles (890 km), San Julián: 425 nautical miles (787 km), Rio Gallegos: 435 nautical miles (806 km) and Rio Grande: 380 nautical miles (700 km).
Due to the distance required to fly to the islands, two minutes was the average time Argentine attack aircraft had available in the target area.
Argentine Navy Lt Owen Crippa and his Aermacchi MB-339
HMS Fearless at San Carlos
Gate guardian at the flying club Mar del Plata painted in the colours of 3-A-314 , the last A-4Q to attack HMS Ardent
IAI Dagger
British troops yomp to Stanley