Kuropatkin had reported a victory at Liaoyang to Tsar Nicholas II in order to secure reinforcements brought in by the newly completed Trans-Siberian Railroad, but the morale of his forces was low, and the besieged Russian garrison and fleet at Port Arthur remained in danger.

Although he needed to reverse the tide of the war, Kuropatkin was reluctant to move too far from Mukden due to the approach of winter, and the lack of accurate maps.

[3] The Russians suffered heavy casualties in the east and were pushed back in the west, forcing Kuropatkin to commit part of his reserves into a Central Detachment to fill in the gap created.

Russian operations were hampered by Kuropatkin's distrust of his generals, and often dispatched orders directly to their subordinates without informing Stackelberg or Bilderling.

Although only 100 feet tall, it commanded a wide view of the plains south of Mukden and was regarded as strategically important by the Russians, who had occupied it on 9 October.

[3] Ōyama committed part of his reserve - Lieutenant General Ueda Arisawa with the IJA 5th Division – in an unsuccessful attempt to cut Stakelberg off.

[3] Kuropatkin then called off the offensive, and both sides began preparations for the upcoming winter by building fortifications and digging trenches, in some places only a few meters apart.

Tactically, the Japanese had advanced 25 kilometers on the road to Mukden, but more importantly had blocked a major Russian counter-offense and effectively ended any hope of relieving the Siege of Port Arthur by land.