[11] Consequently, on 21 January, Savige directed the 3rd Division under Major General William Bridgeford to take "swift and vigorous action" to destroy Japanese forces in southern Bougainville.

[17][18][19] In late January, a company from the Australian 25th Infantry Battalion—under Lieutenant Colonel John McKinna—subsequently carried out an amphibious landing south of Motupena Point, on the Solomon Sea coast and had cleared towards Matsunkei.

[20][Note 6] Meanwhile, further to the east, the 9th Infantry Battalion was moved by truck from Torokina to the Jaba River and then moved by barge along the Empress Augusta Bay coast, landing at Mawaraka from where they advanced towards Mosigetta, and the 61st Infantry Battalion also proceeded towards there, setting off from the junction of the Jaba and Pagana Rivers while the 2/8th Commando Squadron provided flank security further to the east.

[23][Note 7] Throughout March, the 25th Infantry Battalion continued to expand its perimeter, to the north and south, along the Buin Road, while the 9th moved west from Mosigetta to link up with them and the 61st skirted east around Makapeka.

[20] By late March, though, heavy rain temporarily stopped the Australian advance, as the main road became impassable due to thick mud.

The 25th Infantry Battalion, which had established its headquarters and main defensive position around the knoll, in front of the Puriata River, sent out patrols every day, and on 9 March, one of these reported having killed 10 Japanese soldiers without loss to itself.

[23] The Japanese also began making dawn attacks, in which light machine gunners would approach by stealth, set up and fire on the Australian positions, then retire to their own lines, 250 yd (230 m) away.

[28] The 25th Infantry Battalion's commander, McKinna, ordered the two platoons led by Lieutenant Dick Jefferies to attack the pillboxes, supported by a section of machine guns, and several PIAT anti-tank weapons.

Supported by heavy artillery, mortars and machine guns, it proved successful, largely after the individual efforts of Corporal Reg Rattey, who single-handedly silenced several bunkers.

The Australians had been alerted to their approach after the communication line between the two positions had been cut, and when the attack began the men had already been roused and the weapons pits fully manned.

A number of Japanese survivors managed to dig-in near the perimeter and later fired upon the Australian clearing patrol that was sent out the following morning, as well as snipe at the company defending 'B' Echelon's position.

Following this, sporadic fighting continued into the early morning, when at 04:45 on 29 March a force of about 100 Japanese attacked the position supported by sustained machine gun and rifle fire.

[27][37] Throughout 29 March, the Japanese continued the tactic of using small-scale attacks to test the Australian defences and isolate the 25th Infantry Battalion's forward companies from its headquarters and rear.

[38] Communications between the brigade and battalion headquarters and the forward company positions broke down at this stage and runners had to be dispatched to pass a message asking for artillery support.

When they were 400 yd (370 m) from the forward positions, the infantry deployed to the left and right of the tanks and they began their advance to contact, arriving just in time to help defeat the Japanese attack.

[39] As the forward companies began to move back towards the main defensive position, jeeps were sent up to collect the wounded while McKinna led a force of two platoons and two tanks out to the perimeter at the Hatai junction.

[41] The next morning, 1 April, the Australians extended across the Kero Creek and advanced north to the Puriata where they established a perimeter 1,000 yd (910 m) south of Slater's Knoll.

That evening, the Australians launched a series of determined counterattacks in order to re-establish contact between Slater's Knoll and the forward companies, however, these were turned back.

Finding its way blocked by wire obstacles and lacking the equipment necessary to remove them, it was forced to halt its advance and cover the flank of Colonel Toyoji Muta's 13th Infantry Regiment, which was attempting to launch an assault across the Puriata.

[21] The Japanese quickly deployed and attempted to launch an attack; however, in the confusion the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment was cut off from the rest of the assault force.

[42] On 2 April, the Japanese divisional commander, Akinaga, called the 13th and 23rd Infantry Regiments back across the Puriata, to a position south-west of the Pain feature.

[36] At this point, the decision was made to launch a fresh attack aimed at taking Slater's Knoll and eliminating the Australian forces in the area surrounding the Puriata ford.

[36][44] They overwhelmed the Australian forward positions, but finding their way blocked by wire obstacles and lacking any equipment to deal with them the Japanese attack stalled.

[36] Quickly, the situation was turned back in favour of the Australians, and the Japanese were cut down by heavy defensive artillery fire and by well-sited machine guns.

Just after midday, two tanks were dispatched from the 'B' Echelon perimeter, escorted by a company from the 61st Infantry Battalion, arriving on the knoll by 13:45 where they were used as fire support as the Australians began to carry out mopping up operations, flushing out small groups of survivors all around the position.

Long argues that these figures are problematic, as based upon the same report, the Japanese believed that there were only 400 Australians in the region during the battle, and yet they claimed to have killed almost five times that number.

[52] After the battle, the Japanese forces in the area pulled back to the Hongorai River, where they were reorganised due to the heavy losses, with several infantry, engineer and artillery units being amalgamated.

Lacking food, suffering the effects of disease, and isolated from home, morale amongst the Japanese troops fell heavily, with many realising that the war was lost.

[53] Operationally, the battle proved to the Australian high command how effective armour could be when used in close co-operation with infantry and in protecting the lines of communication.

[49] While the Japanese soldiers and officers on the ground fought bravely, continuing the assault even when it was clear it had failed, ultimately the battle proved to be a decisive Australian victory; however, James notes that poor planning and unreliable communications had also contributed to the result.