Because of a series of command failures, the Confederates were unable to inflict serious damage on the Federals and could not prevent their safe passage north to Franklin during the night.

[4] Hood moved through northern Alabama and concentrated his army at Florence from October 30 to November 21, waiting for supplies and to link up with his newly assigned cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Beauregard, urged Hood to take immediate action in an attempt to distract Sherman's advance, emphasizing the importance of moving before Thomas could consolidate his forces.

[5] The Army of Tennessee marched north from Florence on November 21 in three columns: Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's corps on the left, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee's in the center, and Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart's on the right, all screened aggressively by Forrest's cavalry.

Forrest's wide turning movement with 4,000 troopers had forced Wilson north to Hurt's Corner, preventing the Union horsemen from interfering with Hood's infantry advance.

Their mission initially was to protect the trains, but also to hold the crossroads at Spring Hill to allow the entire army to withdraw safely to Franklin.

The cavalrymen, low on ammunition, pulled out of the line and moved north to be ready to cover a further advance of Hood's army, or to block Schofield's withdrawal.

As soon as Schofield departed, Stephen D. Lee coincidentally began an attack against the Union position, although he had considerable difficulty deploying pontoon bridges for the river crossing.

Whereas Cheatham was expecting Cleburne to drive north into Spring Hill, Hood's intention was to use this formation to sweep toward the turnpike and wheel left to intercept Schofield's arriving units, but he apparently had not observed the location of the Union positions south of the town.

The stairstep echelon formation was therefore less effective against Bradley's fortified position on their right and front, allowing only Lowrey's brigade to engage them initially.

After Lowrey requested assistance, Cleburne personally led Govan's Arkansas brigade forward, wheeling them into a northern alignment against Bradley's right flank.

Cleburne's two brigades chased them vigorously, and they were stopped short of the turnpike only by heavy fire from the IV Corps artillery, placed earlier by Stanley on a knoll north of the creek.

By the time Cheatham and Brown were able to speak, at around 6:15 p.m., the battlefield was in total darkness, and the two officers decided that an assault conducted then without knowing the condition of their right flank might be a disaster.

He indulged in a large dinner at Oaklawn, which included considerable "toasting" of drinks, and went to bed at 9 p.m., confident that whatever setbacks his army had suffered during the day, they would be able to correct them in the morning and bag Schofield.

[16] Earlier in the afternoon, Hood had brought up Stewart's corps across Rutherford Creek and directed him to move north of Spring Hill and cut off the Federal column.

There he conferred with Forrest about the positions of the army, when suddenly one of Cheatham's staff officers arrived and directed in Hood's name that Stewart's corps move to support Brown's attack.

After Stewart's column retraced its route, he arrived at Brown's command post, but was confused about the apparent disagreement in orders he was receiving, so he traveled back to Hood's headquarters for clarification.

Gen. Lawrence S. Ross's cavalry brigade attempted to block the passage of the supply trains north of Spring Hill, at Thompson's Station, but accompanying Federal infantry drove them off.

A private soldier woke up the commanding general at 2 a.m. and reported he saw the Union column moving north, but Hood did nothing beyond sending a dispatch to Cheatham to fire on passing traffic.

[18] By 6:00 a.m. on November 30, all of Schofield's army was well north of Spring Hill and its vanguard had reached Franklin, where it began to build breastworks south of town.

In the morning Hood discovered Schofield's escape, and after an angry conference with his subordinate commanders in which he blamed all but himself for the failure, ordered his army to resume its pursuit, setting up the disastrous Battle of Franklin that afternoon.

One of the more persistent is that the general was debilitated from ingesting laudanum in the evening, attempting to relieve the pain and irritation to his amputated leg by the long, damp ride over rough roads that day.

Eric Jacobson's book, For Cause & for Country, lists many authors who have supported this story, but he states that "there is no evidence that Hood took any sort of drugs, or even alcohol, at Spring Hill.