Emperor Hirohito's stance was even more conservative: he believed that it would take at least a year for the Japanese to solidify their positions in their newly captured territory and consolidate their strength before conducting any further operations.

Thus, the Japanese high command decided to wait until 1939 before conducting a swift, aggressive offensive in order to decisively end the war in China.

Earlier that year, Chiang had also resigned from his post as Premier of the Executive Yuan, in order to fully dedicate his efforts to the war.

[citation needed] However, the IJA was reluctant to continue following this approach of following waterways, and instead pursued the Chinese army retreating from the Shanghai-Nanjing theatre, driving northwards into the three provinces of Jiangsu, Shandong and Henan.

[citation needed] A significant proportion of the Chinese forces that withdrew from Shanghai crossed the Yangtze River northwards into the Jiangbei region.

Simultaneously, in Northern China, Rensuke Isogai's 10th Division, advanced southwards between Qingcheng and Jiyang to cross the Yellow River, approaching the Jiaoji railway.

[citation needed] Under the command of Sun Zhen, the 22nd Group Army had deployed four of its six divisions to assist the war effort in Northern China.

Despite lacking winter uniforms or even a single map of the province, they immediately engaged the Japanese for 10 days at Yangquan (阳泉), incurring heavy casualties.

During this time, Zhang Zizhong's 59th Army, also a Northwestern unit, had moved eastwards from Xuzhou along the Longhai railway, passing Tai’erzhuang before advancing northwards towards Linyi.

The Japanese defeat at Linyi at the hands of the inferiorly trained and equipped Chinese regional units set the scene for the eventual battle at Tai’erzhuang .

Chiang Kai-shek then ordered Li Zongren to utilize 'offensive defense' ), i.e. seizing the initiative to actively attack, instead of passively defending.

Fighting fiercely from 12 to 25 February, the respectable combat performance of the 12th Corps in particular helped to ameliorate the reputational damage that Han Fuju had otherwise inflicted upon on the Shandong units.

The Japanese made some strategic changes as a result of these Chinese counterattacks: they cancelled their original plan of directly advancing westwards from Nanjing to Wuhan, so that more troops could be spared for the push towards Xuzhou.

The 31st Division under General Chi Fengcheng reached the town on March 22, and was ordered to delay the Japanese advance until the rest of the Army Group arrived.

[19] When night fell, three thousand Chinese troops rushed out of the gates and attacked the Japanese lines under cover of darkness, forcing them back to the northeast by dawn.

The fighting in Taierzhuang's streets was thus fought almost entirely by infantry, with each side relying on rifles, pistols, hand grenades, bayonets, and knives.

Historian Peter Harmsen notes that it was in these close-quarters conditions where Chinese soldiers were able to fight as the equals, if not the superiors of their Japanese enemies, as shown in the Shanghai suburb of Luodian the year prior.

Having consulted their German advisors earlier, the commanders of the 5th War Area had prepared a double envelopment of the outstretched Japanese forces in Taierzhuang.

[18] Between March and April 1938, the Nationalist Air Force of China deployed squadrons from the 3rd and 4th Pursuit Groups of fighter-attack planes in the long-distance air-interdiction and close-air support of the Taierzhuang operations.

At the same time, the Chinese 55th Corps of two divisions made a surprise crossing across the Grand Canal and cut the railway line near Lincheng.

By this point, the Japanese divisions in Taierzhuang had run critically low on ammunition, fuel, and food and water, and many of their troops were suffering from fatigue and dehydration after over a week of intense fighting.

Chinese troops, as part of the "dare-to-die" corps, strapped explosives like grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and threw themselves under Japanese tanks to blow them up.

[41] Frank Dorn, an American military officer stationed in China between 1934 and 1939, recorded that some 16,000 Japanese soldiers were killed in action on the Taierzhuang battlefield.

Due to a lack of fuel and the hasty Japanese retreat, many of their tanks, trucks and artillery pieces were abandoned on the battlefield to be captured by the Chinese.

Peter Harmsen and Stephen MacKinnon wrote that Chinese casualties matched Japanese losses in magnitude, roughly 20,000 in total.

[26] The Japanese claim in their combat reports that the withdrawal was due to command and communication failures, and do not portray a decline in ammunition types amongst their troops.

[46] The Imperial Japanese Army's 5th and 10th Divisions recorded that between February and May 1938, they lost some 2,369 killed and another 9,615 wounded, however these figures include other operations and units not present at Taierzhuang.

[15] Chinese Historian Jiang Keshi analysis of Japanese records indicated that of the two main units present, the 10th Division's Seya Task Force suffered 411 dead and 1,319 wounded.

General Feng Yuxiang compared the trapped Japanese in the Ta Kung Pao newspaper to "soft-shelled turtles in a closed jar.

"[48] Amid the celebrations of the victory in Hankou and other Chinese cities, Japan initially denied its defeat and ridiculed the reports of the battle for days.