After landing on the Cape Bon Peninsula and conducting a successful campaign, the fleet returned to Sicily, leaving Regulus with 15,500 men to hold the lodgement in Africa over the winter.

The war continued for another 14 years, mostly on Sicily or in nearby waters, before ending with a Roman victory; the terms offered to Carthage were more generous than those proposed by Regulus.

[3][4] His works include a now lost manual on military tactics,[5] but he is best known for his The Histories, written sometime after 167 BC, or about a century after the Battle of the Bagradas River.

[7][8] Carthaginian written records were destroyed along with their capital, Carthage, in 146 BC and so Polybius's account of the First Punic War is based on several, now-lost, Greek and Latin sources.

[17] Other, later, histories of the war exist, but in fragmentary or summary form,[3][18] and they usually cover military operations on land in more detail than those at sea.

[22] Carthage was a well-established maritime power in the Western Mediterranean; Rome had recently unified mainland Italy south of the Arno River under its control.

[23] By 256 BC the war had grown into a struggle in which the Romans were attempting to decisively defeat the Carthaginians and, at a minimum, control the whole of Sicily.

[23] The Carthaginians were engaging in their traditional policy of waiting for their opponents to wear themselves out, in the expectation of then regaining some or all of their possessions and negotiating a mutually satisfactory peace treaty.

The war there had reached a stalemate, as the Carthaginians focused on defending their well-fortified towns and cities; these were mostly on the coast and so could be supplied and reinforced without the Romans being able to use their superior army to interfere.

[25][26] The focus of the war shifted to the sea, where the Romans had little experience; on the few occasions they had previously felt the need for a naval presence they relied on small squadrons provided by their allies.

[30] Both sides were determined to establish naval supremacy and invested large amounts of money and manpower in maintaining and increasing the size of their navies.

[33] The Roman fleet of 330 warships plus an unknown number of transports sailed from Ostia, the port of Rome, in early 256 BC, jointly commanded by both consuls for the year, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso Longus.

[43] As a result of the battle, the Roman army, commanded by Regulus and Longus, landed in Africa near Aspis (modern Kelibia) on the Cape Bon Peninsula and began ravaging the Carthaginian countryside for supplies to feed their 90,000 rowers and crew, and 26,000 legionaries.

Hamilcar and two previously unknown generals named Hasdrubal and Bostar were placed in joint command of an army which was strong in cavalry and elephants and was approximately the same size as the Roman force.

[59][58] Polybius differs in stating that Regulus initiated the negotiations, hoping to receive the glory of ending the war before his successors arrived to replace him.

In either case Regulus, within sight of what he took to be a thoroughly defeated Carthage, demanded harsh terms: Carthage was to hand over Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica; pay all of Rome's war expenses; pay tribute to Rome each year; be prohibited from declaring war or making peace without Roman permission; have its navy limited to a single warship; but provide 50 large warships to the Romans on their request.

[58][60][note 4] Most male Roman citizens were liable for military service and would serve as infantry, a better-off minority providing a cavalry component.

Many would be from North Africa which provided several types of fighters including: close-order infantry equipped with large shields, helmets, short swords and long thrusting spears; javelin-armed light infantry skirmishers; close-order shock cavalry carrying spears; and light cavalry skirmishers who threw javelins from a distance and avoided close combat.

[68][69] Both Spain and Gaul provided small numbers of experienced infantry; unarmoured troops who would charge ferociously, but had a reputation for breaking off if a combat was protracted.

[76][77] Xanthippus led the army of 100 elephants, 4,000 cavalry and 12,000 infantry – the latter included the 5,000 veterans from Sicily and many citizen-militia[78] – out of Carthage and set up camp close to the Romans in an area of open plain.

Polybius considered this to be an effective anti-elephant formation, but points out that it shortened the frontage of the Roman infantry and made them liable to being out-flanked.

[53][83] Regulus apparently hoped to punch through the elephants with his massed infantry, overcome the Carthaginian phalanx in their centre and so win the battle before he needed to worry about being attacked on the flanks.

The rest of the Roman infantry had difficulties with the elephants, who were not deterred by their noise but charged home, inflicting casualties and considerable confusion.

[85][86] The Romans held firm, possibly partly because of the way their dense formation jammed them close together, but the elephants continued to rampage through their ranks, and the Carthaginian cavalry pinned them in place by hurling missiles into their rear and flanks.

[92][93] The Roman fleet, in turn, was devastated by a storm while returning to Italy, 384 ships having been sunk from their total of 464[note 9] and 100,000 men lost,[93][94] the majority non-Roman Latin allies.

[47] The war continued for a further 14 years, mostly on Sicily or the nearby waters, before ending with a Roman victory; the terms offered to Carthage were more generous than those proposed by Regulus.