On 21 June, with a Franco-German armistice about to be signed, the Italians launched a general offensive along the Alpine front, the main attack coming in the northern sector and a secondary advance along the coast.

[7] The aftermath of the war in Ethiopia saw a reconciliation of German-Italian relations following years of a previously strained relationship, resulting in the signing of a treaty of mutual interest in October 1936.

These were Albania; Tunisia; Corsica, an integral part of France; the Ticino, a canton of Switzerland; and all "French territory east of the River Var", including Nice, but not Savoy.

He delivered a long speech on international affairs and the goals of his foreign policy, "which bears comparison with Hitler's notorious disposition, minuted by Colonel Hossbach".

On 31 March, Mussolini stated that "Italy will not truly be an independent nation so long as she has Corsica, Bizerta, Malta as the bars of her Mediterranean prison and Gibraltar and Suez as the walls."

[36] On 26 May, Mussolini informed Marshals Pietro Badoglio, chief of the Supreme General Staff, and Italo Balbo that he intended to join the German war against Britain and France, so to be able to sit at the peace table "when the world is to be apportioned" following an Axis victory.

[64] By December 1939, all mobile troops had been stripped from the Armée des Alpes, moved north to the main front against Germany, and his general staff much reduced.

[84] Italy was prepared, in the event of war, for a defensive stance on both the Italian and Yugoslav fronts, for defence against French aggression and for an offensive against Yugoslavia while France remained neutral.

[95] Marshal Rodolfo Graziani had complained that due to the lack of motor vehicles, the Italian army would be unable to undertake mobile warfare as had been envisaged let alone on the levels the German military was demonstrating.

In orders to his troops on 18 June, General Paolo Micheletti of the 1st Alpine Division "Taurinense" advised that "a strong resistance cannot be anticipated, owing to the shaken [French] morale.

[131] On 18 June, the guns of Fort Chaberton, which dominated the Col de Montgenèvre, fired upon the small French Ouvrage Gondran, near Briançon, in aid of the Italian ground advance.

[58] During the day, Army Group West received two seemingly contradictory orders: "the hostilities against France had to be immediately suspended" and "the preparation for the previously announced [...] operations should continue at the same pace".

Cavagnari preferred to utilize his surface force to mine the Sicilian Channel while deploying his submarines en masse to seek out and engage Allied ships.

The report turned out to be incorrect, the French entered the sights of the Italian submarine Dandolo which fired torpedoes, without success, on the light cruisers Jean de Vienne, La Galissonnière, and Marseillaise.

[125] On 17 June, the Italian submarine Provana attacked a French convoy off Oran but was depth charged by the sloop La Curieuse, forced to surface and then sunk by ramming.

[150] At 2000 hours on 20 June, Mussolini countermanded the attack order, but before it could go out to the troops, he received confirmation that Germany was continuing its push down the Rhône valley despite the impending armistice.

[156] This route was covered by the Redoute Ruinée, the ruins of an old fort, which the French garrisoned with seventy men plus machine guns,[156][t] and by the avant-poste (advance post) at Seloge (Séloges).

Their subsidiary objective called for them to break through the French forts at Bessans, Lanslebourg and Sollières-Sardières and the collection of ouvrages (Saint-Gobain, Saint-Antoine, Sapey) overlooking Modane and then turn north in the direction of Albertville.

The main attack of the I Army Corps was a three-pronged drive by the Division Cagliari, involving the capture of Bessans and Bramans, followed by a concerted advance along the river Arc toward Modane.

A planned naval landing at Garavan by the Blackshirts (Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale, MVSN) on 24 June had to be called off because of high waves and a full moon.

[41] The capture of "the pearl of France", Menton, a famous tourist destination, was "an undeniable success (despite its cost)" (un succès incontestable [même s'il a coûté cher]).

[41] Mussolini visited the scene of the battle on 1 July and claimed, in a subsequent radio broadcast from Rome, that "our infantry were supported by an artillery train which came through the tunnel under La Mortola and shelled the strongly held town [Menton] in which the enemy was maintaining an obstinate resistance".

[w] Along the northern front of the 1st Army, the 33rd Infantry Division "Acqui", based at the entrance of the Valle Stura di Demonte, comprised six battalions and one legion of the MVSN[x] and possessed thirty 81-mm mortars, twenty-four 75/13 mountain guns and twelve 100/17 model 16 howitzers.

Its radios did not function in the rainy weather, and it soon left its food supply far in the rear, but on 23 June it reached the Maddalena Pass—with only one 100/17 howitzer in tow—and began descending the Ubaye Valley into France.

It lasted only twenty-five minutes, during which Roatta read out loud Italy's proposed terms, Huntziger requested a recess to confer with his government and Ciano adjourned the meeting until the next day.

[169] At 1915 hours on 24 June, at the Villa Incisa, after receiving his government's permission, General Huntziger signed the armistice on behalf of the French, and Marshal Badoglio did so for the Italians.

[184] MacGregor Knox wrote that the claims of Ciano and Alfieri are fanciful but "Mussolini's humiliation over the results of the first day's attack in the Alps ... did contribute to his decision to reduce his demands".

[187] Gerhard Weinberg wrote that "the singularly inglorious record of the Italians in what little fighting they had done ... facilitated German policy" and forced Mussolini to review his armistice demands.

[143] Italian troops stuck in the snow were easy targets for French snipers and the winding mule trails provided plenty of opportunity for SES squads to lay ambushes.

For example, on 23 June, the front-line commander of the 4th Alpine Division "Cuneense" complained to his superior of the 2nd Army that he was unable to keep in touch with the troops at the front because he could not move his headquarters up the mountain due to the weather.