Drier weather and extensive road repairs made it much easier for the British to move vast amounts of supplies forward from the original front line.

German defences on the Gheluvelt Plateau, which had been retained or quickly recaptured in July and August were lost and the British began a run of success which lasted into early October.

The Kerensky Offensive by Russia in July had accelerated the disintegration of the Russian Army, increasing the prospect of substantial German reinforcements for the Western Front.

[1] The German 4th Army had defeated British attacks on the black and green (second and third) lines set for 31 July, in the centre and on the Gheluvelt Plateau on the southern flank of the battlefield during the frequent weather interruptions in August.

[3] After 31 July, Gough had ceased attempts to exploit opportunities created by Fifth Army attacks and began a process of tactical revision, which with the better weather in September, inflicted several costly defeats on the Germans.

The 4th Army had spread strong points and pillboxes in the areas between their defensive lines and made rapid counter-attacks with local reserves and Eingreif divisions, against Allied penetrations.

Another German counter-attack at 7.30 p.m. by fresh storm-troops, forced the battalion to retire, except from a small area 150 yd (140 m) forward, which was abandoned next day; the division suffered c. 800 casualties.

[21] Plumer planned to capture Gheluvelt Plateau in four steps at six-day intervals, for time to bring forward artillery and supplies, a faster tempo of operations than that envisaged by Gough before 31 July.

[24] The evolution in organisation and method was to ensure that more infantry were on tactically advantageous ground, having had time to consolidate and regain contact with their artillery before German counter-attacks.

Loßberg ordered the front line of sentry groups (Postengraben) to be held rigidly; British attacks would exhaust themselves and then be repulsed by local German reserves or by Eingreifdivisionen.

The British had a huge mass of artillery and the infrastructure necessary to supply it with ammunition, much of it built opposite the Flandern I Stellung in the period between the attack at Messines and 31 July.

General von Kuhl (Chief of Staff, Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht) doubted that the offensive had ended but by 13 September had changed his mind.

Steady pressure in early September from the 47th (1/2nd London) Division, had advanced the British front line near Inverness Copse for a considerable distance, which made better jumping-off positions for the attack by the Australians.

Most German troops encountered were so stunned by the bombardment, that they were incapable of resistance and surrendered immediately, despite few of the concrete pillboxes and Mebu shelters being destroyed by the British artillery.

The Wilhemstellung (third line) pill-boxes and Mannschafts – Eisenbeton – Unterstände (Mebu) shelters were captured quickly, while the German defenders were dazed by the bombardment and unable to resist.

Further to the left, Anzac House, an important German artillery observation post, which overlooked the Steenbeek valley to the north, was captured as the garrison tried to engage the Australians by moving their machine-guns outside.

Local operations were mounted to stop sniping, using the methods that had been so successful earlier in the morning, leading to Black Watch Corner at the south-west of Polygon Wood and Garter Point east of Anzac House and other strong-points being captured.

The 23rd Division had to fight forward through pillboxes hidden in ruined cottages along the Menin Road, concrete shelters in Veldhoek and a hedgerow in front, before the German garrisons retreated.

The left hand brigade was held up by a dozen pill-boxes in the Wilhemstellung until noon, which caused the division many losses but the ground at the final objective proved to be dry enough for the troops to dig in.

The large numbers of strong points, pillboxes and fortified farms east of the Hanebeek and Steenbeek streams were mostly intact, despite numerous attempts to smash them with artillery fire.

The South Africans managed to capture Bremen Redoubt and Waterend House in the Zonnebeek valley and extend a defensive flank back to the first objective.

By these advances, XVIII Corps got observation of Poelcappelle and up the Lekkerboterbeek and Lauterbeek valleys, the capture of which allowed British artillery to move forward of the Steenbeek.

On the southern edge of the plateau, German troops dribbling forward in the 39th Division area, managed to reinforce the garrison at Tower Hamlets, then tried twice to advance to the Bassevillebeek and were "smashed" by artillery and machine-gun fire.

In spite of this the counter-attacks did not take effect until the late afternoon; for the tremendous British barrage fire caused most serious loss of time and crippled the thrust power of the reserves.

[66] In 1948, James Edmonds, the British official historian, wrote that with the exception of the failure to capture Tower Hamlets atop the Bassevillebeek Spur, the objectives of the attack had been achieved and the Germans tactically confounded.

On 20 September and the next few days of local fighting, the German had been driven from the positions on the Gheluvelt Plateau that had been the site of the main defensive effort (Schwerpunkt) since July.

[67] In 1996, Prior and Wilson wrote that the battle had been more costly relative to the ground gained on 31 July, even with the artillery reinforcements and better weather, that made British artillery-fire more accurate.

The British gunners produced a "wall of fire" 1,000 yd (910 m) deep, that swept the ground and then continued as a standing barrage for several hours after the end of the infantry advance.

[76] Crown Prince Rupprecht wrote in his diary for 23 and 24 September that he could not allow the British to remain in control of the higher ground around Zonnebeke or the Gheluvelt Plateau and that counter-strokes during the next enemy attack must reach their objectives.

The German infantry advanced in the morning mist, either side of the Reutelbeek stream as the artillery boxed the British opposite, isolated them from their supports and preventing ammunition and other supplies from being brought to the front line.