Wurst Farm was at the lower end of Gravenstafel Ridge and several British attacks in the area since 31 July had been repulsed by the Germans.

XVIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Ivor Maxse) of the Fifth Army was to advance onto the Gravenstafel Spur, an area held by the German 36th Division since 8 September.

The 58th (2/1st London) Division objective was 1,000 yd (910 m) ahead, among German strongpoints on Wurst Farm Ridge, at the west end of Gravenstafel Spur.

Late in the afternoon, a counter-attack by the 234th Division to recover the Wilhelmstellung on the XVIII Corps front was routed, with up to 50 per cent casualties in some battalions.

The German 4th Army (General Friedrich Sixt von Armin) operation order for the defensive battle at Ypres had been issued on 27 June.

[3] The front position, forward zone and much of the Albrechtstellung had fallen since the Battle of Pilckem Ridge (31 July – 2 August).

Local withdrawals according to the concept of elastic defence had been rejected by Loßberg, the 4th Army Chief of Staff, who believed that they would disorganise the troops moving forward to counter-attack.

Front line troops were not expected to cling to shelters, which were mantraps but evacuate them as soon as the battle began, move forward and to the flanks to avoid British fire and then counter-attack.

A small number of machine-gun nests and permanent garrisons were kept separate from the counter-attack organisation, to provide a framework for defence in depth once an attack had been repulsed.

[6] From 8 September, the Wilhelmstellung on this part of the front had been held by the 36th Division of the 4th Army, with Infantry Regiment 175 (IR 175), IR 128 and Grenadier Regiment 5 (GR 5) occupying 800–900 yd (730–820 m) frontages opposite XVIII Corps, with a battalion each in the outpost zone, one in support and one in reserve, behind Flandern I Stellung.

The rifle, rather than hand-grenades, was made the primary infantry weapon and Stokes mortar fire was added to creeping barrages.

[11] The ground around the Langemarck–Zonnebeke road was unfavourable for an attack, despite the drier weather of September, being low-lying, swampy with the approaches and broken up by three weeks of bombardment, which slowed movement.

If successful, the Chinese attack would induce the Germans to return fire and reveal the position of hidden machine-guns and pillboxes.

[14] Before the main attack, the 58th Trench Mortar Battery fired twenty bombs at a pillbox and had ten hits, which demoralised the occupants.

On the right flank, C Company of the 2nd/4th Battalion, the London Regiment, 173rd Brigade performed the Chinese attack to divert German attention and captured Winnipeg crossroads.

At the summit, the two battalions advanced on Von Tirpitz redoubt and Wurst Farm from behind, keeping close behind the creeping barrage.

Just before 6:00 p.m., the 58th (2/1st London) Division commenced firing with machine-guns and Lewis guns at 1,500 yd (1,400 m), which inflicted casualties and forced the numerous small German columns to deploy into line.