[7][8] The operation began in the early hours of 3 August 1943, with the objective of following up the successful Soviet defensive effort in the Battle of Kursk.

The operation led to the retreat of the German forces in Ukraine behind the Dnieper River and set the stage for the Second Battle of Kiev in autumn 1943.

However, due to heavy losses sustained during the Battle of Kursk in July, time was needed for the Soviet formations to recover and regroup.

Against this the German army could field 200,000 men and 237 tanks and assault guns.When the Soviet Southern Front and the Southwestern Front launched a diversionary attack across the Dnieper and Mius Rivers in an apparent attempt to cut off the German forces extended in the southern portion of the German Army Group South on 17 July, its commander General Erich von Manstein responded by moving the II SS Panzer Corps, XXIV Corps and XLVIII Panzer Corps southward to blunt the Soviet offensive.

A secondary attack to the west of the main breakthrough was to be conducted by the 27th and 40th Armies with the support of four separate tank corps.

By 5 August the Soviets had broken through the German defensive lines, moving into the rear areas and liberating Belgorod while advancing some 60 km.

[12] German reserves were shifted from the Orel sector and north from the Donbas regions in an attempt to stem the tide and slow down the Soviet attacks.

[14] With the Soviet advance around Bogodukhov stopped, the Germans now began to attempt to close the gap between Akhtyrka and Krasnokutsk.

[16] Following its withdrawal from Belgorod on the night of 5/6 August 1943, the XI Army Corps under the command of General Erhard Raus now held defensive positions south of the city between the Donets and Lopan Rivers north of Kharkov.

Only reaching the final defenses north of the city on 12 August 1943, following breakthroughs by the 57th and 69th Armies in several sectors of the front-line, the disintegration of the 168th Infantry Division and after an intervention by the corps reserve.

[16] When its attempts to force a breakthrough in the Bogodukhov-Olshany-Zolochev met with frustration along the Merla River, the Steppe Front directed its assaults towards Korotich, a sector held by SS Division Das Reich, to cut the Poltava-Kharkov rail link.

The way to Poltava now remained open, but Soviet General Nikolai Vatutin hesitated to push through while the Germans flanking the gap held firm.

[20] Kharkov now constituted a deep German salient to the east, which prevented the Red Army from making use of this vital traffic and supply centre.

[21] The German supply situation in Kharkov was now untenable; artillerymen, after firing their last rounds, were abandoning their guns to fight as infantry.

The Soviets sensed that the Germans were evacuating Kharkov, due to the lessening of artillery fire and diminishing resistance in the front lines.

Moving out of Kharkov to the south, the German forces fought to hold open a corridor through which the 8th Army could withdraw.

The Red Army, on the other hand, employed the rippling effect that marked their offensives: if thwarted in one place, they would quickly shift to others.

Soviet casualties in the Belgorod–Kharkov sector during this operation are estimated to be 71,611 killed and 183,955 wounded; 1,864 tanks, 423 artillery guns, and 153 aircraft were lost.