Alternatively, on the other side of the Apennines, Highway 7 (the old Roman Appian Way) followed along the west coast but south of Rome ran into the Pontine Marshes, which the Germans had flooded.

The German 10th Army had Traugott Herr's LXXVI Panzer Corps (LXXVI Panzerkorps) deployed on the eastern side of Italy, from the Apennine Mountains to the Adriatic, and Frido von Senger und Etterlin's XIV Panzer Corps (XIV Panzerkorps) on the western side, from the mountains to the Tyrrhenian Sea.

On 3 October, a battalion of the British Eighth Army's 78th Infantry Division had crossed the Biferno river to confront the German Volturno-Viktor Line defences.

Two Commando battalions landed from the sea north of the river at Termoli, and a fiercely contested battle ensued which had hung in the balance when a ford became unusable after heavy rains and prevented Allied armour from moving forward.

Port and transport capacity had also been affected by the logistic requirements of the Allied air force, which was establishing a large number of strategic bomber bases around Foggia.

[5] Eighth Army also devised a deception scheme involving false troop movements and ammunition dumps to give the impression that the main attack would be through the British XIII Corps front.

[7] On 18 November, Lemelsen had signaled Kesselring to the effect that the Allied concentrations on the coast led him to expect the main attack on his left wing.

[8] Then, heavy rain raised the river levels, which caused the postponement of the offensive to the night of 27 November and giving the Germans time to switch two divisions across the Apennines to the defending LXXVI Panzer Corps.

The complications of those manoeuvres introduced considerable confusion within the Germans' alignment, but they still managed a fighting withdrawal to the ridge on the far side of the Moro River.

Unaware of the disorganisation in the German ranks, the New Zealanders failed on 2 December to exploit an opportunity to capture Orsogna, a key position near the headwaters of the Moro, which on that day was still only lightly held.

However, the Battle of Ortona took another week of fierce house-to-house fighting as the German 3rd Parachute Regiment tenaciously held on before it withdrew to the other side of the Riccio River on 28 December.

After advancing a total of only 18 miles (29 km) and sustaining 6,500 casualties,[17] blizzards, drifting snow and zero visibility in late December, jagged terrain caused Eighth Army's offensive on the Adriatic front to grind to a halt.

[18][19] The rest of the winter on the Adriatic front was spent in bitterly uncomfortable conditions with the opposing sides often in close proximity and engaged in night-time patrolling and vicious skirmishing.

In the centre of the Fifth Army front lay the Mignano Gap, which, because of the marshy conditions on the coastal plain, represented the only realistic path to the mouth of the Liri Valley, the route to Rome.

By mid-November, it was clear that after having sustained 10,000 combat casualties since the Volturno Line offensive, the Fifth Army needed to pause, reorganise and regather its strength.

The first attack, Operation Raincoat, was delivered after an intensive artillery and air bombardment, by the British X Corps on the left (comprising the 46th and 56th Infantry Divisions) and elements of the U.S. II Corps, commanded by Major General Geoffrey Keyes, including the 1st Special Service Force, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Frederick, on the right against the formidable Camino hill mass.

On 8 December the US 3rd and the 36th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Special Service Force of II Corps launched the attack on Monte Sambúcaro[nb 2] and into the Mignano Gap.

However, the German positions at San Pietro in the valley held firm until 16 December, when an attack launched from the Camino mass took Monte Lungo.

The Germans could no longer expect to hold San Pietro when the dominating ground on both flanks, Monte Lungo and the Sambúcaro[nb 2] peaks, was in II Corps' possession.

Several attacks were made in the next few days, and Morello Hill, overlooking the San Vittore positions from the north, was captured on 26 December.

On the US VI Corps front, progress was made but proved very difficult over the mountainous terrain as the weather deteriorated further with the onset of winter.

[22] At the end of December, the Fifth Army had to pause once again to reorganise, replace its losses and gather itself for a final push to reach the Gustav Line defences.

The MATAF took advantage of the moment to harass the retreating Germans by attacking them directly and also by severing their supply line in the world’s first major and intentional air interdiction campaign.

The planning for Operation Strangle ensured that it would be delayed as the mechanics of air interdiction could be studied, and units prepared and used to that form of combat.