[1] Having distinguished himself repeatedly on the northern frontier (1792–1793) and in the eastern Pyrénées (1793–1794), Clauzel was made a chef de battalion and given the honour of bringing twenty four flags taken from the Spanish back to Paris to present to the National Convention.

A short peace enabled Napoleon to organise the LeClerc expedition to reassert French control in the lucrative colony of Saint-Domingue following the Haitian revolution.

General LeClerc died to yellow fever in 1803 when Clauzel became disillusioned with the new commander-in-chief Rochambeau's use of extreme violence and indiscriminate killing in an attempt to reassert French control.

Masséna's failures saw him replaced by Marmont, under whom Clauzel worked to re-established the discipline, efficiency, and mobility of the army, which had suffered severely in the retreat from Torres Vedras.

This left other theatres less strongly held, Wellington having previously secured key fortresses at the Spanish Portuguese border opted to attack threatening the northern road connecting Madrid to Burgos and then France.

Mormont attempted this by marching to turn Wellingtons flank and threaten its lines of communication back to Portugal it was these manoeuvres that instigated the Battle of Salamanca.

With both Marshal Marmont and General Bonet wounded, Clauzel, as the most senior officer available assumed command of the French forces under challenging circumstances.

Clauzel's strategy aimed to counter the attack on his left flank by launching an assault on the Anglo-Portuguese center to capture the lesser Arapile.

[3][4] However, his offensive proved unsuccessful as it was met with staunch resistance from fresh enemy troops, resulting in disarray among the French forces and leaving them vulnerable to subsequent assaults on their left and center.

The battle culminated in a resounding defeat for the French, with Butler noting that the engagements had rendered the divisions of Maucune, Thomières, and Clauzel incapable of functioning as cohesive military units.

Under the supreme command of Jean-de-Dieu Soult, he continued to serve throughout the rest of the Peninsular War, seeing action at major battles Nivelle, Orthez and Toulouse and personally securing a minor French victory at Aire.

While there were no major battles on this front before Napoleon surrendered, Clauzel did manage to gain the ire of French royalists with his actions in chasing the Duchess of Angoulême out of Bordeaux.

[5] Clauzel seized the first opportunity to return and assist the Orléanist Liberals in France when he was pardoned in 1820, serving in the Chamber of Deputies for Ariège in 1827, then for Ardennes in 1830.

Bourmount even intended to lead his troops back to France to restore the Bourbons but, with little support from the rank and file, he opted instead to go into exile in Spain.

[6] As a veteran of the war in Spain, characterised by insurgency and resistance, given the numerous grievances of Algerians against Ottoman rule, Clauzel attempted to steer French policy away from the likelihood of a protracted engagement.

However, his approach involved a political settlement between the French, who would take over as suzerain over the Husaynid rulers of Tunis who would gain control over much of Algeria beyond some major ports.

[6] Although Clauzel acted in the absence of orders from the War Ministry and while debates were live in parliament about what to do with the territories in North Africa, he did set out a clearly defined goal for France in Algeria that matched the military forces available to him given the limited political will in the early 1830s for a large and expensive commitment of troops.

Clauzel wrote and advised on what policy France should take to secure her interests now that the occupation had become permanent, as well as providing information about the geography and politics of Algeria.

[9]By summer 1835, an uneasy truce had broken down and hostilities between France and Abd al-Qadir had erupted as Makhzen tribes from around Oran sought French protection.

These victories were however spoiled as Clauzel struggled to strike a decisive blow against Abd al-Qadir and by political missteps, such as his imposition of a massive indemnity upon Tlemcen, thereby failing to turn his conquests into allies.

Historian James McDougall argues in his History of Algeria that General Bugeaud's actions to conclude a treaty subsequent to Clauzel's removal with Abd al-Qadir were short-sighted and only gave a defeated enemy time to regroup while extracting meaningless concessions.