Birger Dahlerus

He had an excellent network of contacts of authoritative Englishmen and various leaders of the Third Reich, such as his early acquaintance with Hermann Göring.

[3] On 7 August 1939, Dahlerus arranged a meeting at his own house, near the Danish border in Schleswig-Holstein, between Göring and seven British businessmen:[4] The businessmen attempted to persuade Göring that the British government would stand by its treaty obligations to Poland, which obliged it to support the Polish government in any conflict in which it became embroiled.

[5] At the Nuremberg trials, the British prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, was able to persuade the Swede that he had been badly misled by the German leaders, and that the discussion had no effect on the policy and actions of the Third Reich.

[7] Göring had summoned Dahlerus from Stockholm on the previous day, put him on an aircraft and dispatched him to inform the British government that Germany wanted an understanding with Britain.

He persuaded Halifax to write a letter, couched in nonspecific terms, indicating the desire of the British government for peace and requesting a few days' leeway in which to achieve it.

[9] Dahlerus had become so significant, according to his own testimony, that he felt able to advise the British government that it should keep Ambassador Nevile Henderson in London until the next day so that he could better react to Hitler's response.

On 29 August, at a meeting with the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Henderson had been presented with a document containing 16 points that Germany demanded agreement by Poland.

His statement, presented at Nuremberg, described the atmosphere as negative and suggested Göring's confidence in the ability of Germany to crush Poland quickly.

Cadogan, a committed anti-appeaser, was only the Under-Secretary of State, and Dahlerus insisted that his comments to be submitted to the British Cabinet, which they duly were.

[16] Göring and Hitler were completely intransigent and willing to make peace only on their own terms: keeping all their conquests and retaining a free hand in Eastern Europe.

[20] Still, the proposals were a nonstarter, and the British began losing interest in Dahlerus and his flurry of activity, as they indicated that no promises from Hitler would be trusted anymore.

Essentially, Dahlerus tried to convince the British government that Göring was ready to do a deal with Britain behind Hitler's back.

In practice, Dahlerus was helping the Nazi leadership to dupe and to confuse the British to weaken their resolve and perhaps to compromise them into publicly accepting the possibility of peace without Germany relinquishing its gains or dismantling the regime.