Black Prince (rocket)

It would have made heavy use of the preceding Blue Streak missile and the Black Knight test rocket development programmes, as well as some new elements, to produce a British-built launcher capable of deploying medium-sized payloads into orbit.

Popularly known as the Black Prince due to its assigned rainbow code, in official documentation, the platform was referred to as the Blue Streak Satellite Launch Vehicle (BSSLV).

The Black Prince gained several supporters, including official government backing following the termination of military involvement in the Blue Streak programme during early 1960.

During the early 1950s, the British government had identified the need to develop its own series of ballistic missiles due to advances being made in this field, particularly by the Soviet Union and the United States.

[4][5] Following several launches, the Black Knight came to be regarded as a successful programme, having produced a relatively low cost and reliable rocket, and thus there was impetus present to proceed with further development of the platform.

[6] The Black Prince itself has its origins in a proposed design that was put forward by Desmond King-Hele and Doreen Gilmour of the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) during 1957.

[8] The proposal, which subsequently became widely known as the Black Prince, quickly attracted the attention of a key supporter in Dr Geoffrey Pardoe, the project manager for the Blue Streak missile programme.

Aerospace author C.N Hill wrote that this declaration had been made: "Mainly, I suspect, to minimise the political damage that ensued from the [Blue Streak] decision".

[10] The 1957 concept design for a combined Blue Streak-Black Knight launcher was put forward once again, and this time received a favourable appraisal; the project was assigned the rainbow code of Black Prince.

In response to this initiative, work on the Black Prince launcher by the RAE and Saunders Roe soon came to a halt as attention from the British government waned and European negotiations continued.

[20] Ultimately, none of the ELDO members showed particular enthusiasm for the Europa launcher, which, according to Hill, was often regarded as being unnecessary and having been based on 'old technology', leading to the programme being both a political and technical failure.