The landmark nature of the case was alluded to by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who characterized the decision as a "Number 10 earthquake".

When his wife filed for divorce in 1996, Blakely kidnapped her from her home in rural Grant County, Washington, at knifepoint, forced her into a wooden box in the back of his pickup truck, and took her to Montana.

If one is convicted of first-degree kidnapping of a minor in Washington state, one must register as a sex offender upon release from prison.

Under Washington law, second-degree kidnapping was a class B felony, punishable by a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.

Blakely appealed, arguing that this unexpected additional factfinding on the judge's part violated his Sixth Amendment right under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to have the jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all the facts legally necessary to his sentence.

In an unusual turn of events, the local county prosecutor, John Knodell III, asked Washington's governor for permission to personally argue the case before the U.S. Supreme Court.

[4] During oral argument, Justice Scalia challenged[5] Knodell for attempting to impose a prison sentence much longer than what state law authorized.

This rule promoted the historic concerns of the jury-trial requirement — to subject all accusations against a criminal defendant to the "unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors," and to confirm the existence of those facts essential to the punishment under the law.

The Court's "commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial.

Second, the legislature could establish judicial limits that were not too excessive, a necessarily subjective standard that would be hard for the Court to monitor and adjust as necessary.

By enacting its sentencing guidelines, Washington did not intend to "manipulate the statutory elements of criminal offenses or circumvent the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights.

Rather, lawmakers were trying to bring some much-needed uniformity, transparency, and accountability to an otherwise 'labyrinthine sentencing and corrections system that 'lacked any principle except unbridled discretion.'"

Far from "disregarding principles of due process and the jury trial right," O'Connor argued, the guidelines system honored them.

Bifurcated proceedings may become commonplace in criminal trials, so that a jury might not improperly consider prior bad acts during the guilt phase but properly consider them when it comes time for sentencing.

But the result of this system would be the same as the first option — prosecutors would end up with the discretion to determine the defendant's sentence by manipulating the charge.

Finally, Breyer argued that legislatures needed to retain the constitutional authority to make the labelling decision between an "element" of a crime and a "sentencing factor."

Without the ability to do so, legislatures cannot create "sentencing systems that are consistent with, and indeed may help to advance, the Constitution's greater fairness goals."

The Court's opinion in Booker came out on January 12, 2005, and drastically changed the legal framework within which federal sentencing takes place.