[1][2] For it to occur, bottom-up perceptual mechanisms, such as the input of visual information, must override top-down knowledge that the certain body (or part) does not belong.
The scans showed increased activity in the parietal lobe and then, right after, as the subjects began to experience the rubber hand as their own, in the premotor cortex, the region of the brain involved in planning movements.
[7] The experimenters used the same procedure as the previous experiment to establish that feeling of ownership involved with the stimulation of the premotor cortex.
This was demonstrated subjectively by questionnaire and physiologically through heart-rate deceleration in response to a threat to the virtual body.
In the study, male participants entered the virtual reality simulation and experienced various forms of stimulation including arm-stroking and other physical sensations.
The integration of touch stimulation via the somatosensory system with visual input is essential for creating the body transfer illusion.
[10] Specifically the rubber hand illusion is associated with activity in the multisensory areas, most notably the ventral premotor cortex.
This would explain why the presence of the rubber hand is enough to enable the illusion to persist, even when in attenuated form, when visuo-tactile inputs are asynchronous.
The similarities include increased subjective reports of embodiment of the rubber hand during the illusion, and that the dextroamphetamine enhancing effect is also seen during sensory asynchrony.
Yet, the scientific investigation of bodily experiences in general, and self-attribution/body ownership and self-localization/embodiment more specifically, have proven difficult and have not received the attention they deserve given their importance for neuroscientific models of self and self-consciousness.
[17] In 2022, Slater and Ehrsson argued that Lush's claims were not supported by the data and that the major factor driving the rubber hand illusion is multisensory integration.