Estimated a lightly defended target, confusion in the mission plan and communication problems led to the force being held up at the assembly point, where German night fighters slipped in among the bombers.

The military base at Mailly was just north of the community of Mailly-le-Camp, 80 miles east of Paris along the national road linking Châlons-sur-Marne to Troyes.

[3] In the 1930s it was used for their armoured formations, but since the fall of France it had been taken over by the Germans and used to train replacement crews for panzer units refitting from losses suffered in the east.

The organization's Brutus-Nord network was given the assignment of producing detailed plans of the panzer training grounds, and for providing a regularly updated inventory of the German units present.

In April 1944 Bomber Command shifted its bombing campaign from German industrial centers to the destruction of the Wehrmacht's infrastructure in occupied Europe.

Since proving it to Harris a week earlier in a raid against the railyards at Munich, 5 Group had been given a measure of autonomy from the rest of Bomber Command.

[14] As curfew for troops on the continent was midnight, Cheshire was to drop his target marking flares at 12:01, one minute after soldiers were required to return to barracks.

[16] Cochrane stated that both groups would hit the depot buildings, but enticed Rice by noting the base had a tank repair facility that was a special target.

There they would make a second 90 degree turn, coming north to Bayeux 20 miles northwest of Caen, heading back across the Channel for Selsey Bill and England.

The low altitude of the bombers would place them in range of light flak, but the lowest aircraft would still be 2,000 feet above the height of the bomb blast shock delivered by the "cookies".

[20] The mission was to unfold as follows: just before midnight Mosquitos from PFF were to drop shielded illumination flares over Mailly-le-Camp, using Oboe to confirm their location.

After the first wave of bombers had passed over the target the bombing would be halted, while Cheshire used the next 9 minutes to return over Mailly and mark the west end of the camp.

[22] As aircraft arrived they would make large left hand circles there until they received word that the target was accurately marked, so they could begin their bomb runs.

On reaching the assembly point, we were to circle the avenue of flames, and await the instructions from the Master Bomber who would give the go ahead to head for the target and bomb precisely on the markers.

"[23] Though the target itself would not be heavily defended by Flak placements, a problem lay in the fact that four German night fighter airbases were within easy reach of the assembly point: III/NJG-1 at Athies-sous-Laon, I/NJG-4 at Florennes, II/NJG-4 at Coulommiers, III/NJG-4 at Athies, plus III/NJG-5 and I/NJG-5 at St.

[25] In reviewing the mission, author and former RAF bomber pilot Jack Currie noted "That a planning staff could contemplate, or a commander countenance, any plan of action in which a possibility existed - even a remote one - of several hundred fully-laden Lancasters orbiting a marker, in bright moonlight, within striking range of at least four night-fighter bases, staggers the imagination.

To avoid alerting the training camp, he flew on to St. Dizier and made a few passes over the night fighter base there to give the appearance of an intruder flight.

The arriving bombers began to make their large left hand circles about the marker while they awaited the signal to commence their bomb runs.

Radio silence, normally strictly observed, went by the wayside as pilots succumbed to the anxiety and frustration and gave voice to their displeasure.

In an unfortunate twist of fate, US Armed Services Radio was broadcasting big band swing music that night on the same RT frequency that the RAF was using for the raid.

[38] Not realizing there was a second marking point to be illuminated, Deane took this moment to attempt to refresh the original red markers.

However, he was unable to raise Deane, so Cheshire ordered Kearns and Fawke to drop their secondary markers on the west end of the target as originally planned.

"[2] The force of heavy bombers headed to the target en masse, and the full weight of high explosives were dropped upon the camp.

This was the kind of destruction German cities had been suffering under for over a year, but it was the first time the soldiers of the Wehrmacht were exposed to the heavy delivery of bombs that Bomber Command was beginning to master.

Destroyed in the bombing were 114 barrack buildings, 47 transport sheds, 65 vehicles, and 37 tanks, while 218 instructors and soldiers were killed with 156 more being wounded.

Communication difficulties were exacerbated by interference from an American Armed Forces radio broadcast, whose powerful transmission was on the same channel as the RT for the bombardment groups.

Dietrich Schmidt of 8/NJG-1 scored 3 victories in 30 minutes before damage to his aircraft from defensive fire required he and his crew to bail out.

The civilian deaths that did occur, including the 16 that died in Poivres and the 5 at Trouan-le-Petit in the Aube, were killed when they were struck by the debris of destroyed aircraft.

[47][48] The mission gave critics the chance to claim Cheshire's low level marking technique would not work for Main Force operations without grievous loss.

On the men that flew the mission, author and Bomber Command veteran Jack Currie wrote: What has to be remembered about Mailly-le-Camp is that, with all hell bubbling up around them and their fabric of existence hanging by a thread, the great majority of captains and crews gritted their teeth and waited for the order.