Bosnian Crisis
[9] This unilateral action – timed to coincide with Bulgaria's declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire on 5 October – sparked protestations from all the Great Powers and Austria-Hungary's Balkan neighbors, Serbia and Montenegro.
Although the crisis ended with what appeared to be a total Austro-Hungarian diplomatic victory, it permanently damaged relations between Austria-Hungary and its neighbors, especially Serbia, Italy and Russia, and in the long term helped lay the grounds for World War I.
Under article 29, Austria-Hungary received special rights in the Ottoman Empire's provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.
"[14] The Bosniak-dominated Sanjak of Novi Pazar separated Montenegro from Serbia and prevented the geographic and political union of these two states which were often closely aligned.
The Austrian occupation of the Sanjak was also significant because it provided Austria-Hungary with a staging area for possible future expansion towards the Aegean port of Salonika in Ottoman controlled Macedonia.
Austria-Hungary exercised its legal rights, taking firm control of Bosnia-Herzegovina and jointly occupying the Sanjak of Novi Pazar together with the Ottoman Empire.
The Russian Foreign Minister, Count Michael Muraviev, stated that an Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would raise "an extensive question requiring special scrutiny".
However, Russia's ability to support Serbia was greatly reduced following military humiliation in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and the ensuing internal unrest.
[19] By 1907, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Aehrenthal began formulating a plan to solidify Austria-Hungary's position towards Serbia through annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
This treaty bottled up the Black Sea Fleet, a major portion of the Russian Navy, making it useless in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 when it was urgently needed.
By far the angriest reaction came from Serbia, which called for revenge, and began setting up secret guerrilla bands, plotting insurrection in Bosnia.
It decided it would firmly support Austria despite doubts about the wisdom of annexing Bosnia; Berlin explicitly warned St Petersburg that continued demands for an international conference constituted a hostile action and increased the risk of war with Germany.
In the long run, however, Germany and Austria both made too many enemies, as the battle lines of World War I started to harden.
[23] On 2 July 1908, Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky sent a letter to Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Aehrenthal and proposed a discussion of reciprocal changes to the Treaty of Berlin in favour of the Russian interest in the Straits of Constantinople and Austro-Hungarian interests in the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.
[25] On 16 September, Izvolsky and Aehrenthal met face-to-face at Buchlau Castle in Moravia, the private residence of Count Leopold Berchtold, ambassador of Austria-Hungary in Saint Petersburg.
[26] By Aehrenthal's account given by Albertini, Izvolsky agreed that Russia would maintain "a friendly and benevolent attitude" if Austria-Hungary were to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Reciprocally, should Russia move to open "the Straits to single ships of war", Austria-Hungary would maintain a benevolent attitude.
Bulgarian independence and the Bosnian annexation were not covered by the Treaty of Berlin and set off a flurry of diplomatic protests and discussions.
The Ottoman Empire protested Bulgaria's declaration of independence with more vigor than the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which it had no practical prospects of governing.
German opposition and complex diplomatic maneuvering as to the location, nature and preconditions of the conference delayed and ultimately scuttled it.
[34] The mutual compensation clause was article 7 of the 1909 and of 5 December 1912 versions of the same treaty: However, if, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea should become impossible, and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two Powers, based upon the principle of reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the present status quo, and giving satisfaction to the interests and well-founded claims of the two Parties.
[35]British opposition to amending the Treaty of Berlin with respect to the Straits left Russia empty-handed and therefore Izvolsky and the Tsar regarded the annexation and Aehrenthal's maneuvers as made in bad faith.
Tsar Nicholas II wrote to Emperor Franz-Joseph and accused Austria-Hungary of betraying confidence and relations between the two countries were permanently damaged.
[37] Under such pressure, Izvolsky caved and advised the cabinet to accept the amendment of Article 25 for fear that otherwise Austria would be free to act against Serbia.
It ran: Serbia recognizes that she has not been injured in her right by the fait accompli created in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that consequently, she will conform to such decision as the Powers shall take in regard to Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin.
Conformable to these declarations and confident of the pacific intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia will reduce her army to the position of spring 1908 as regards its organization, its distribution and effectiveness.
[41] The Russian diplomat and newspaperman de Schelking relates Izvolsky's political downfall: "In the Salons of Petrograd he was given the Sobriquet 'Prince of the Bosphorus'.
