Yugoslavia submitted to the ICJ an argument that the only obligations of the state parties to the convention are to prevent and punish genocide by legislation, prosecution or extradition.

[3][4] The Court held that interpretation of the Convention turns on the ordinary meaning of its terms read in their context and in light of its object and purpose.

[6][7] The then vice-president of the Court, Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh, dissented on the grounds that "Serbia's involvement, as a principal actor or accomplice, in the genocide that took place in Srebrenica is supported by massive and compelling evidence.

[8]Serbia's violations of its obligations stem not only from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide but also from two "provisional protective measures" issued by the International Court of Justice in April and September 1993.

The judges concluded that despite this explicit order, Serbia did nothing in July 1995 to prevent the Srebrenica massacre, although it "should normally have been aware of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be committed.

Moreover, "it has been established by fully conclusive evidence that members of the protected group were systematically victims of massive mistreatment, beatings, rape and torture causing serious bodily and mental harm, during the conflict and, in particular, in the detention camps."

This is not to say that acts described as 'ethnic cleansing' may never constitute genocide, if they are such as to be characterized as, for example, 'deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part', contrary to Article II, paragraph (c), of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with the necessary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the destruction of the group, as distinct from its removal from the region.