The Court found in its verdict that the United States was "in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State", "not to intervene in its affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956."

[4] Nicaragua, under the later, post-FSLN government of Violeta Chamorro, withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 following a repeal of the law which had required the country to seek compensation.

The United States had long been opposed to the socialist FSLN, and after the revolution the Carter administration moved quickly to support the Somocistas with financial and material aid.

When Ronald Reagan took office, he augmented the direct support to an anti-Sandinista group, called the Contras, which included factions loyal to the former dictatorship.

It is noteworthy that the United States, the respondent party, was the only member that put forward arguments against the validity of the judgment of the court, arguing that it passed a decision that it "had neither the jurisdiction nor the competence to render."

Members that sided with the United States in opposing Nicaragua's claims did not challenge the court's jurisdiction, its findings, nor the substantive merits of the case.

[19] Arming and training the Contra was found to be in breach with principles of non-intervention and prohibition of use of force, as was laying mines in Nicaraguan territorial waters.

He argued that the Sandinista government achieved international recognition and received large amounts of foreign aid in exchange for commitments they subsequently violated.

These proposals were rejected by the Sandinistas, and Schwebel argued that the U.S. was entitled to take action in collective self-defense with El Salvador by authorizing Contra aid in December 1981.

He wrote that since early 1985 the U.S. had increasingly made regime change a primary objective but that this was not inconsistent with self-defense because it was reasonable to believe that Nicaragua would not maintain any commitments unless Sandinista power was diluted.

In December 1981, the U.S. Congress authorized an initial appropriation of 19 million dollars to finance paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.

According to Commander Carrion, the offensive known as "C Plan" had the objective of capturing the Nicaraguan border town of Jalapa in order to install a provisional government, which could receive international recognition.

After the failure of the Jalapa offensive the contras changed their tactics from frontal assaults to economic warfare against State farms, coffee plantations, grain storage centers, road junctions, etc.

As a part of its training program for the contras, the CIA prepared and distributed a manual entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare.

After the United States Congress approved an additional $24 million aid to the contras in December 1983, a new offensive was launched, named Plan Sierra.

In the beginning of 1984, the contras made a major effort to prevent the harvesting of the coffee crop, which is one of Nicaragua's most important export products.

Commander Carrion testified that the ability of the contras to carry out military operations was completely dependent upon United States funding, training and logistical support.

Carrion stated that the U.S. Government supplied the contras with uniforms, weapons, communications equipment, intelligence, training, and coordination in using this material aid.

[21] David MacMichael was an expert on counter-insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and Latin American affairs, he was also a witness because he was closely involved with U.S. intelligence activities as a contract employee from March 1981 – April 1983.

Including a fall 1981 meeting, which submitted the initial plan to set up a 1500-man covert force on the Nicaraguan border, shipping arms from Nicaragua to the El Salvador insurgents.

[23][24] "The overall purpose (for the creation of the contras) was to weaken, even destabilize the Nicaraguan Government and thus reduce the menace it allegedly posed to the United States' interests in Central America..." Contra paramilitary actions would "hopefully provoke cross-border attacks by Nicaraguan forces and thus serve to demonstrate Nicaragua's aggressive nature and possibly call into play the Organization of American States' provisions (regarding collective self-defense).

He termed the evidence that had been publicly disclosed by the U.S. Government concerning Nicaraguan arms deliveries to the El Salvadoran insurgents as both "scanty" and "unreliable".

The conclusions of the report were summarized by Glennon in Court: We found that there is substantial credible evidence that the contras were engaged with some frequency in acts of terroristic violence directed at Nicaraguan civilians.

Professor Glennon testified that no such investigation had ever been conducted, because in the words of a ranking State Department official who he could not name, the U.S. Government maintained a policy of "intentional ignorance" on the matter.

[25] Father Jean Loison was a French priest who worked as a nurse in a hospital in the northern frontier region close to Honduras.

Asked whether the contras engaged in acts of violence directed against the civilian population, Father Loison answered: Yes, I could give you several examples.

At that time, El Salvador was receiving substantial funding and military advice from the U.S., which was aiming to crush a Sandinista-like revolutionary movement by the FMLN.

El Salvador's ruling junta was at that time receiving substantial funding and military advisement from the U.S., which was aiming to crush a Sandinista-like revolutionary movement by the FMLN.

Sofaer said "We felt the Nicaragua case was an unfortunate signal to us that we should be concerned about our security interests and about the use of the court for political-public relations purposes.

A month after the announced withdrawal, Secretary of State Shultz suggested, and President Reagan later confirmed in a press conference, that the goal of U.S. policy was to overthrow the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua.