It was created to better control the growing Allied forces based in Egypt and to direct their efforts to lift the siege of Tobruk via Operation Crusader.

[1] During the inter-war period, the Middle East and the canal gained further importance as oil production expanded and as aerial links between Britain and British India were developed.

Troops were moved from near Cairo and from the canal zone to Mersa Matruh, 170 mi (270 km) west of Alexandria in the Western Desert, to be in a position to protect Egypt from an Italian invasion from their Libyan colony.

[6] After Operation Sonnenblume the dispatch of Axis reinforcements to Africa, Italo-German forces riposted in March 1941, which drove the main British body into Egypt and destroyed part of the 2nd Armoured Division.

This led to the siege of Tobruk and required the bulk of the German and Italian troops to maintain and hindered further large Axis offensive operations.

These took account of the majority of the German military being involved in Operation Barbarossa the invasion of the Soviet Union and the need to show that British forces were doing their part in bringing about the defeat of the Axis powers.

Due to the increased size of the British forces in Egypt and the forming second corps, it was decided in September 1941, that a field army headquarters was needed to direct these formations.

[16][17] The Eighth Army was responsible for operations in the Western Desert and was supported by the existing command, British Troops in Egypt, that controlled the lines of communication, the Egyptian anti-aircraft defences and internal security behind the front.

[20] One of the first tasks undertaken by the Eighth Army, with X Corps (Lieutenant-General William Holmes) that had recently arrived in Egypt, was to conduct preliminary work on defensive positions at El Alamein.

The Eighth Army established forward supply bases, field maintenance centres and constructed a 160 mi (260 km) pipeline to provide water.

His replacement was Auchinleck's deputy chief of the general staff, Major-General Neil Ritchie, who was chosen due to his familiarity with the Crusader plan.

He also noted that while Cunningham was "an imaginative choice", it was later clear his "appointment was a mistake" due to his lack of experience and confidence in the mobile requirements of the fighting in North Africa.

This was compounded by a lack of experience in controlling formations or desert fighting and that for the ten-day period after his appointment, Auchinleck remained at Eighth Army headquarters and was effectively in command.

[27] Following Crusader, Ritchie and Auchinleck planned Operation Acrobat, an attack to capture the remainder of Italian Libya, Tripolitania (potentially in conjunction with an Allied landing in French Morocco).

Ritchie initially dismissed the seriousness of the Axis move and Auchinleck deemed it wiser to yield some territory while the Eighth Army continued to build its logistical base for Acrobat.

The 1st Armoured Division bore the brunt of the attack and was pushed back, while it covered the retreat of the remainder of the Eighth Army to Gazala where it established a defensive line.

Political pressure mounted for the Eighth Army to launch an offensive, which would support Malta and defeat the Axis powers in Africa prior to development of any potential Japanese threat to the Middle East and the army's supply lines; supply convoys ran from the UK, around the Cape of Good Hope, and then through the Indian Ocean to the Middle East.

[30] In May, an Axis attack on the Eighth Army was expected although an optimistic attitude was held that it would be repulsed, and the Italian-German defeat would allow for the capture of the remainder of Cyrenaica.

The latter, with no experience in desert warfare or command, retained the mentality of his prior positions rather than asserting his own authority and consulted with Auchinleck before taking action.

[33] On 25 June, Auchinleck decided to take direct control of the Eighth Army; a move that was supported by Churchill, who had called for such a change before Gazala.

[37] Auchinleck decided that a final battle would not take place at Mersa Matruh and ordered the reorganisation of the Eighth Army's divisions.

X Corps was out of radio contact and were not informed of the withdrawal until 28 June, when they were able to escape although due to the loss of equipment and unit cohesion its divisions were in need of rest and refitting following the battle.

While preliminary defensive work had taken place, which included the creation of a water pipeline and the laying of minefields, it was not until the arrival of the bulk of the Eighth Army that major improvements were made.

Over the course of July, the Eighth Army fought the First Battle of El Alamein during which the Axis attacks were halted but Auchinleck's counter-attacks were also stopped.

The campaign official history noted that following the final failed counter-attack, "Auchinleck then decided that he must make a long pause to rest, reorganize, and re-train his sadly battered army".

[42] The fighting in North Africa had caused concern with the British public and in the United States where Churchill had just visited to conduct the Second Washington Conference.

Case Blue the German advance into Caucasus as well as the Japanese threat influenced Auchinleck's thinking on the disposition of his theatre-wide forces, including the Eighth Army.

He delivered pep talks to groups of soldiers, was open to discuss policy with the rank and file and used these opportunities to disperse the Rommel myth.

[46] At the end of August and stretching into September, the Eighth Army defeated the next Axis offensive, the Battle of Alam el Halfa.

This was followed, in November, by the Eighth Army's offensive, the Second Battle of El Alamein that resulted in the Axis defeat and a pursuit across Libya to Tunisia.