An order for ten BAC One-Eleven jet aircraft in May 1961 launched BUA's fleet re-equipment programme in support of its long-term policy to develop primarily as a scheduled airline.

BUA's takeover of the South American services of British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) to Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay on 5 November 1964 marked a major expansion of its long-haul scheduled network.

The simultaneous launch of daily One-Eleven jet services from Gatwick to Glasgow, Edinburgh and Belfast on 4 January 1966 made BUA the first scheduled all-jet operator on UK domestic trunk routes.

This included adoption of a new strategy for BUA that aimed to replace the dwindling number of unprofitable trooping flights with growing engagement in the more rewarding European inclusive tour (IT) and transatlantic affinity group charter markets.

[18] In addition to the Safari routes to Africa, BUA also established a network of scheduled services to mainly secondary destinations in Continental Europe, including Barcelona, Gibraltar, Ibiza, Málaga, Le Touquet, Lourdes, Palma, Perpignan, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Channel Islands.

Freddie Laker, BUA's first managing director (MD), used his contacts to British Rail (BR) to create a £100,000 city centre check-in facility in London's West End in a disused part of Victoria Station, which opened in late-April 1962.

BUA's applications included a request for twice-weekly all-economy/colonial coach class flights linking Gatwick with Istanbul, Teheran, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta, Bangkok and Singapore, with a weekly extension to Hong Kong and Tokyo, respectively.

The service, which was marketed as Silver Arrow in the UK and as Flèche d'argent in France, was a joint operation between British Rail (BR), BUA and Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer français (SNCF).

[2][52][54][74][75][76] Faced with this restriction, Laker hit upon the idea to offer an indirect travel option between the city centres of London and Paris by combining the existing Victoria—Gatwick rail link with BUA's Gatwick – Le Touquet traffic rights.

While negotiations with relevant authorities in the UK and destination countries for the grant of interim operating permits to enable the transfer of BOAC's loss-making routes to South America and to ensure continuity of service were still in progress,[2][90][91] BUA's first proving flight to that continent took place on 12 October 1964.

[100] VC10s also replaced Britannias and DC-6s on BUA's routes to East and Southern Africa, where the newly delivered jets took over from the piston/turboprop types on scheduled services from Gatwick to Entebbe, Nairobi, Ndola, Lusaka and Salisbury.

To compensate for this loss of competitiveness, Freddie Laker came up with the novel idea of designing a cargo door to be installed on the left-hand side of the forward fuselage of the airline's VC10s, where the first class cabin was normally located.

[21][101][102][104][105][106][107][108][109][110] BUA's VC10s also had extended wingtips that were slightly bent downwards to reduce the aircraft's cruise drag and to help it overcome the instability encountered when entering a stall, as well as an intermediate, 14-degree flap setting to enable all-year round, nonstop flights from the then relatively short runway at Nairobi's hot-and-high Embakasi Airport to Gatwick with a full payload and reserves.

As a result, one flight terminated in Brazil and end-to-end travelling times on the new Gatwick – Freetown – Buenos Aires – Santiago service reduced by over two hours compared with the previous routeing.

[nb 14][116] The consequent overall capacity increase, including a greater choice of flights and shorter journey times between the UK, Argentina and Chile, made BUA's schedules more competitive with rivals.

[130] BUA also became the only airline in the world to operate One-Elevens on an intercontinental, long-haul scheduled route, when it introduced the 200 series on its multi-stop West African service linking Gatwick with Lagos via Lisbon, Las Palmas,[nb 16] Bathurst, Freetown and Accra.

Although Laker had largely succeeded in welding the various constituent airlines that made up BUA into a single, integrated enterprise towards the end of his tenure while ensuring the business remained profitable, it lacked the quality of a frontline scheduled carrier.

As a result, BUA witnessed a major improvement in the quality of its promotional material and in the number of flights departing on time, making its punctuality record one of the UK airline industry's best.

[143][154] A detailed analysis of BUA's financial results had shown that raising the airline's profile and quality during Max Stuart-Shaw's tenure meant that costs were growing faster than revenues.

This was further compounded by the large number of overheads resulting from the group's complex organisation in which many functions were duplicated and the limited opportunities for independent airlines to operate scheduled services on domestic and international trunk routes in competition with the corporations.

[nb 20][143][155][156] BUA had built up the high cost base of a major scheduled airline while low-yield charter traffic, a substantial amount of which was fluctuating, low-margin short-haul trooping between the UK and Germany,[59] constituted a large part of its business.

Simultaneous development of new scheduled services and integration of existing regional operations in the Channel Islands and on the Isle of Man with the vehicle ferry network proved a costly distraction for overburdened senior sales and commercial managers, taking up a disproportionate amount of their time.

[150][154] To meet the longer term objective of transforming BUA into a viable business with a stable future, the airline's top management team got several, more forward-looking developments started.

These focused on giving planning and a newly created special projects department direct access to the chief executive and putting greater emphasis on fleet modernisation to enhance BUA's competitiveness, including an urgent re-evaluation of the airline's future long-haul requirements.

This was based on the idea that BUA could only become economically viable and realise its full potential if it took maximum advantage of opportunities to develop its business profitably in both the scheduled and non-scheduled markets.

In the late 1960s, a parliamentary committee of inquiry headed by Sir Ronald Edwards, at the time the chairman of the Electricity Council and Professor at the London School of Economics, inquired into the UK's air transport industry and its prospects in the coming decade.

[182][183][184] One of the Edwards report's recommendations was the creation of a financially and managerially sound, so-called Second Force private sector airline[33][117][185][186] to operate a viable network of short- and long-haul scheduled and non-scheduled services.

[196][197] Meanwhile, BUA became a growing burden on the Cayzers' as a result of its disappointing financial performance, a situation made worse by the unexpected loss of one of its most important IT customers to the newly formed BEA Airtours.

[198] Roy Mason, the President of the Board of Trade, gave the Government's preliminary approval to BOAC's proposed takeover of BUA,[33][91][190][199][200][201] on the understanding that there were no realistic prospects of a merger with another independent airline as recommended in the Edwards report.

It involved a BUA mainline BAC One-Eleven 201AC (registration: G-ASJJ) operating a scheduled international passenger flight from Milan's Linate Airport to London Gatwick.