British logistics in the Western Allied invasion of Germany

Originally scheduled to start at the beginning of January 1945, when the ground would have been frozen, Operation Veritable, the 21st Army Group's advance to the Rhine, was delayed for five weeks by the German Ardennes Offensive.

The heavy use of road transport meant that the Second Army burned 7,600 tonnes (7,500 long tons) of petrol a day, but pipelines were laid across the Rhine at Emmerich and were in operation by the end of April.

[1] In mid-March 1945, the 21st Army Group had 1,703 Dutch, 5,982 Czech, 6,696 Belgian, 14,915 Polish, 182,136 Canadian, 328,919 American and 744,361 British servicemen, for a total strength of 1,284,712 personnel.

[14] French, Belgian and Dutch civilian labour was used at the base in a variety of tasks to enable military personnel to be released for service in forward areas.

The bivouac areas were provided with temporary billets, latrines, emergency rations, and fuel, and medical teams and vehicle maintenance crews were on hand.

On 10 February, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division loaded its 450 tanks and 320 Bren gun carriers on flat wagons in Rimini and Riccione, from whence they moved by rail to Leghorn.

[36][37]At the start of January 1945, the stocks of packaged and bulk POL held by the 21st Army Group amounted to 249,000 tonnes (245,000 long tons), representing 58 days' supply at the normal rate of expenditure.

This was more than sufficient to hold the thirty days' reserve of POL that Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) stipulated should be held, but the American fuel position was less favourable.

It was therefore agreed that from 1 March 1945 onwards, 74,000 tonnes (73,000 long tons) of fuel, representing about a third of the supply held in British storage, would be transferred to the Americans so both forces could have thirty days' reserves.

At the beginning of March 1945, the 21st Army Group had a bulk petrol transport capacity of about 2,700 tonnes (2,700 long tons) per day, assuming 80 per cent of the vehicles were running.

[35][b] A major user of fuel was the Fog Investigation and Dispersal Operation (FIDO) system at Épinoy, which consumed 410,000 litres (90,000 imp gal) per night.

[40][46] To free up administrative units to support the advance into Germany, it was decided to shorten the line of communications by closing down the RMA in Normandy, where some 300,000 tonnes (300,000 long tons) of supplies were still held.

The 18th Line of Communications Sub Area was formed on 25 April and assigned to the First Canadian Army; the 19th joined the 15th; and the 20th relieved the 4th around Brussels, allowing it to take over the region to the north east of Nijmegen.

[36] Originally scheduled to start on 12 January 1945, when the ground would have been hard and frozen and off-road vehicle movement possible, Operation Veritable was delayed for five weeks by the Ardennes Offensive.

Temperatures were as low as −15 °C (5 °F) on 26 January, resulting in firm, frozen ground, but a subsequent thaw caused widespread flooding, and by 5 February a section of the Turnhout-Eindhoven road had become impassable even to four-wheel-drive vehicles.

[64] Special tracks were provided for the Bren gun carriers to prevent skidding on icy roads, but these had to be withdrawn when it was discovered that they caused excessive wear and tear on their suspensions.

[63] There was also demand for covered accommodation in the 3,300 bivouacs, and 21st Army Group headquarters released 343 huts and 1,600 45-kilogram (100 lb) tents from its stocks, which were delivered to the railheads around Mill and 's-Hertogenbosch.

[65] It did not remove the need for road transport entirely though, and XXX Corps found that the First Canadian Army was unable to provide any further resources.

Since prompt clearance of the trains was essential to allow turnaround of the locomotives and rolling stock, vehicles had to be used to clear less urgently required supplies such as POL, coal and engineer stores.

The two corps stocked their FMCs by road, but the completion of repairs to the 1,222-metre (4,008 ft) bridge over the Maas at Gennep by the 7th Army Troops Engineers on 20 March relieved the pressure on the one at Grave, and it became possible to move the railhead to within the No.

[78] The British rail line of communications now ran from Antwerp to Nijmegen via Roosendaal and Tilburg,[79] where the railway bridge that had opened on 22 December was duplicated by 3 January 1945.

There were doubts as to whether this need could be met, but the situation was eased by the arrival of 4,700 tonnes (4,600 long tons) of ammunition that had been pre-loaded on some of the transport allocated by the 21st Army Group.

[100][101] The high use of road transport meant that the Second Army was burning 7,600 tonnes (7,500 long tons) of petrol a day, but the supply of fuel caused no problems.

An allocation of 300 tonnes (300 long tons) per day was made, but owing to competing American demands, the use of aircraft to repatriate liberated American, British and Commonwealth ex-prisoners of war (PWX), and a somewhat cumbersome procedure for requesting air deliveries, the tonnage of air freight never reached this level, averaging just 145 tonnes (143 long tons) per day for the month of April.

Four days later orders came that disarmed troops would no longer have prisoner of war status, but would be classified as Surrendered Enemy Personnel, and that their own officers would be responsible for their administration.

Captured German dumps held sufficient quantities of food for them, but they were not always easily accessible or distributable, so some had to be fed from 21st Army Group stocks, on a temporary ration scale of 1,100 calories (4,600 J) per man per day.

Before the war it had imported millions of tons of food from the eastern parts of Germany which were now in the Soviet occupation zone, but the collapse of the transportation system caused by Allied bombing had prevented the movement of foodstuffs, mostly grain and potatoes, in the 1944–1945 agricultural season, and stocks were all but exhausted.

Finding staff for the British control organisations was more difficult, as demobilisation and redeployment for the ongoing war against Japan thinned the ranks of skilled transportation officers.

[120] In the campaign in North-West Europe in 1945, Montgomery sought to contribute to the defeat of Germany and to do so in a manner that displayed a visibly committed and active British role.

[123] The 21st Army Group's logistical system proved capable of keeping the fighting men fed and supplied, whether in the awful weather conditions of Operation Veritable or the fast-moving advance of the final drive beyond the Rhine.