[1] They argued that drift is essentially a principal-agent problem that explores "how—or indeed, whether—elected political officials can reasonably effectively assure that their policy intentions will be carried out.
[18][19] Through statutory control, Congress aims to limit bureaucratic drift before it occurs by exerting influence over the organization of a bureaucracy.
[20][21][22] Oversight, on the other hand, occurs when Congress monitors the actions of bureaucracies and is used to check bureaucratic drift after agencies have acted on policies.
[17][23][24] Police patrol refers to oversight when legislators instigate investigations into bureaucracies and actively search for bureaucratic drift.
[1][17][24] Such oversight may involve legislators monitoring agencies, reading reports, conducting field studies, and questioning officials.
[17][24] This method involves less action by congress, and McCubbins and Schwartz argue that it is preferred by legislators as it allows them to devote less time and resources to oversight.
[17][23][25][26] However, other scholars criticize fire-alarm patrol by arguing that citizens' complaints may never reach legislators and those that do may be deceitful, thus sounding "false alarms".
[2][27][28][29][30] Scholars have argued that the judicial branch checks bureaucratic drift most efficiently when controlling delays of implementing law.
[2][28][29] The same scholars point out that ongoing delays caused by judicial review on agency actions may discourage less organized interest, because such groups lack the resources necessary to maintain an effective coalition over long periods of time.
[2][7] The president has the power to check bureaucratic drift through executive orders and by choosing appointees for the highest post of bureaucracies.
[27][33] Scholars argue that one problem of the executive branch working to reduce bureaucratic drift is that it wastes time and resources that could be spent serving constituents.
[36][37][38][39] These scholars subscribe to the Non-delegation Doctrine, and believe that the risk posed by bureaucratic drift is disruptive enough to American politics that delegation must be reconsidered or even eliminated.