[2] It established the constitutional rule that where an appellate court reverses a criminal conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence[3] to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Double Jeopardy Clause shields the defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense.

[6] David Wayne Burks, the petitioner in this case, pled not guilty "by reason of insanity" to a charge of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C.

[7][8] To support this insanity defense at his jury trial in the Middle District of Tennessee, Burks called as expert witnesses two psychiatrists and a psychologist.

Although they diagnosed him differently, they all testified that the defendant "suffered from a mental illness at the time of the robbery, which rendered him substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law.

'"[10] After each side presented its case, the defendant moved the court for a judgment of acquittal,[11] arguing that the Government's evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt.

The district court denied the motion and submitted the case to the jury, which found the defendant guilty.

[13] The Sixth Circuit agreed that the Government's evidence was insufficient to prove Burks' sanity (and, accordingly, his criminal responsibility) beyond a reasonable doubt.

[2] It, then, instructed the district court to choose between two alternatives on remand: either entering a directed verdict of acquittal or ordering a new trial.

[14] To guide the lower court in this decision, the Sixth Circuit advised it to consider whether the Government could present additional evidence sufficient to justify a new trial, but also gave the court discretion to acquit the defendant if the equities—or fairness—demanded that result: [T]he defendant will be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal unless the government presents sufficient additional evidence to carry its burden on the issue of defendant's sanity.

The Supreme Court granted Burks' petition for a writ of certiorari, taking jurisdiction of the case under 28 U.S.C.

[16][17] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall be .

Among other things, "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.

As the Court recently explained: '[T]he law attaches particular significance to an acquittal,' United States v. Scott,[20] so a merits-related ruling concludes proceedings absolutely.

[22] And retrial following an acquittal would upset a defendant's expectation of repose, for it would subject him to additional 'embarrassment, expense and ordeal' while 'compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.

[18] The Court provided the following justifications for its rule and its rejection of precedent as well as of the Sixth Circuit's equitable remedy: The Court also explained why the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a second prosecution following reversal for trial error—such as flawed jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or prosecutorial misconduct—but not for evidentiary insufficiency.

Because trial errors "impl[y] nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,"[39] the Court reasoned, "[i]t would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction.

Although these issues were not addressed directly in Burks, the Court intimated that such infirmities are to be treated as trial errors.

[46] Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun, dissented, arguing, "If, in seeking to prove Nelson's four prior convictions, the State had offered documented evidence to prove three valid prior convictions and a blank piece of paper to prove a fourth, no one would doubt that [the government] had produced insufficient evidence and that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial.