CIA activities in Indonesia

[2] The humanitarian nature of these rescue missions provided cover for the CIA's real objective: to create a place to perform espionage in what would turn into the nation of Indonesia.

According to the CIA online library, the US needed "a secret foreign intelligence service that preserved OSS's capacity to report 'information as seen through American eyes' and 'to analyze and evaluate the material for policymakers.'

At its inception, the OSS was primarily responsible for protecting the president from surprise attacks and assisting the United States in its Cold War struggle with the Soviets through the feeding of intelligence.

The CIA provided funding, training, and logistical support to opposition groups and paramilitary organizations opposed to Sukarno's rule, leveraging existing tensions and grievances to undermine the government's authority.

[11] Since the late 1950s, the CIA sought to thwart communism in Indonesia due to its proximity to Vietnam and China, the importance of its sea lanes and its oil industry, which was largely foreign run.

[17] President Sukarno, in an address to the UN after the failed coup, denounced imperialism and vowed he was determined not to let a small corner of the world to make a play thing of Indonesia.

In November 1962, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, executive director of the CIA, send a memorandum forwarding the US Air Force Department assessment about the Soviet Union military build-up in Indonesia.

[30] Another memo released by the CIA noted that Indonesia had recently withdrawn from the United Nations and had announced that development of a nuclear weapon would be ready by October 1965.

On October 5, 1965, British diplomat Sir Andrew Gilchrist wrote that, "I have never concealed... my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change".

[55] On the same morning in October, a radio message was transmitted claiming that operation was "supported by troops of other branches of the armed forces" and that Utung acted to prevent a supposed 'generals' coup.

The self-appointed government did not muster support, and a few days later Sukarno regained control, but insisted that this was a political issue and refused to impose harsh penalties on those involved in the "30 September Movement".

A briefing meant for the DCI dated in October 1965 states quite contrarily to what was proven that during the aftermath of the 1965 coup, both governments declared in the region were interdependent on each other; this obviously was proved untrue.

[72] Though Soviet weapons were used to kill members of the PKI, the United States was complicit in providing money and backing to the anti-PKI leaders, General Suharto and Adam Malik.

"[73] The conflict in Indonesia ultimately led to the killing of at least 500,000 people, a number confirmed by Ambassador Green in a 1967 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

He admitted to providing the list of "a few thousand" names of PKI leaders and senior cadre (but not the party rank and file) to Indonesian "non-Communist forces" during the "six months of chaos," but denied any CIA or embassy involvement.

"[38][85] Historian Geoffrey B. Robinson asserts that such U.S. government officials "published memoirs and articles that sought to divert attention from any possible US role, while questioning the integrity and political loyalties of scholars who disagreed with them.

"[91] Writing in his 2020 book The Jakarta Method, Vincent Bevins says that this was not the first instance of US officials providing kill lists of suspected communists to members of foreign regimes, as they had done so in Guatemala in 1954 and Iraq in 1963.

Bevins also notes that it was not a practice of US government officials alone, as managers of US-owned plantations also provided the Indonesian army with lists of "troublesome" communists and union organizers who were subsequently rounded up and murdered.

"[88][93][94] In 2016, Indonesia's human rights commission submitted an official request to the U.S. government to declassify archived files believed to detail the CIA's involvement in the killings.

[96][97] On October 17, 2017, declassified documents from the US embassy in Jakarta covering 1963–1966 revealed that not only did the US government have detailed knowledge of the killings as they happened (and welcomed them), but also had actively encouraged and facilitated the massacres to further their geopolitical interests in the region.

[98] A November 1965 report by the aforementioned political affairs officer, Edward E Masters, examined the spread of large scale executions to multiple provinces and the role of youth groups in helping resolve the "main problem" of housing and feeding PKI prisoners.

He stated that "many provinces appear to be successfully meeting this problem by executing their PKI prisoners, or killing them before they are captured, a task in which Moslem youth groups are providing assistance.

[105] The National Security Archive posted on the internet the results and reports from the 2006 Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR), regarding the reality of the East Timor invasion.

[106] The Commission gathered sources, documents, and information about the invasion and the role that different powers played, "...estimates that up to 180,000 East Timorese were killed by Indonesian troops or died of enforced starvation and other causes resulting from the occupation between 1975 and 1999.

[114] This report accused the Indonesian president of leaving the PKI unchallenged in order to protect his own interests and power, referring back to his Sukarno also made a state visit to the Soviet Union in the late 1950s.

Although he had just returned from a diplomatic trip to the United States where he left positive impressions,[115] in May 1965 President Sukarno openly expressed his concerns over the imbalance of power that had developed in Indonesia.

noting that "Caltex operations...have continued to be profitable," while Stanvac aimed to be sold to the Indonesians for $27.5 million, "even if Permina, the government-owned oil company conducting the negotiations, is abolished.

"[122] The memorandum reveals that "agreements with some 30 foreign companies to explore the country's oil resources have already been reached and expectations are high that important new oilfields will be found," while also noting that increased petroleum production had "little impact" on the Indonesian economy itself.

concluding that "while the PKI made the fraternal and adulatory noises toward Peking and the Chinese revolution...It is out of the Question for Sukarno or Aidit to have offered any outside power 'a piece of the action' or requested help in the September 30 affair.

This prompted the Indonesian military and its militia proxies to launch a "scorched earth campaign" that resulted in the death of over 1,500 Timorese peoples, more than 250,000 forcibly driven across the border into West Timor, and approximately 80% of the country's infrastructure being destroyed.