On 29 October, a Weekly Summary states that a North Korean attack on the South is possible as early as 1949, and cites reports of road improvements towards the border and troop movements there.
Two positions the second case, as revealed in COMINT, large shipments of bandages and medicines went from the USSR to North Korea and Manchuria, starting in February 1950.
[3][4] A report obtained from a "secret" Russian foreign ministry meeting states that North Korea's Nodong-1 is "not useful as a military weapon", based on its poor performance in all areas during a test-firing in the Sea of Japan in 1993.
On 2 February, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch tells a United States Senate Select Committee that North Korea is developing long-range missiles.
The United States, according to Deutch, should focus on stopping North Korea from acquiring guidance-and-control technology that could make its long-range missiles more accurate and lethal.
According to Bill Gertz of The Washington Times, CIA sources said North Korea delivered seven shiploads of Scud-C missiles to Egypt between March and April 1996.
[5] On December 11, according to Barbara Starr of Jane's Defence Weekly (p. 10), former CIA Director Robert Gates told the United States Senate Intelligence Committee that North Korea is having problems developing its Taepodong class of ballistic missiles.