Attended by Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, it outlined the Allied position against the Empire of Japan during World War II and made decisions about post-war Asia.

The Conference agenda was to formulate a strategy to counterattack the Empire of Japan, make arrangements for the post-war international situation and coordinate the counter-attack on Burma and the aid to China.

The Cairo Declaration, issued after the conference, demanded Japan's unconditional surrender, the return to China of all occupied lands, and the shaping of a new post-war East Asia.

Although many of the resolutions and promises made at the conference were not implemented, and the plan of action was repeatedly postponed and changed, the aim of a joint Chinese, British, and American counter-attack on Burma was eventually achieved.

Churchill also held on to the conservative British colonialist mindset and refused to believe that Asians could unite and fight for an Allied victory[4] He was also prejudiced against China and did not want it to become a world power.

Even if both the Kingdom of Italy and Nazi Germany surrendered, the British Navy still preferred to field its spare forces in the Pacific Ocean, rather than Burma.

Furthermore, Roosevelt wanted the Four Policemen (the United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China) to guide and guard the post-war world from potential conflicts.

[15] Roosevelt crossed the Atlantic on the battleship USS Iowa and arrived in Tunis that day on the Air Force One from Oran (modern-day Algeria) to meet General Eisenhower.

[12] John Patton Davies, Second Secretary of the US Embassy in Chongqing, sent a memorandum to Roosevelt against the use of US troops to help the British, Dutch, and French rebuild their colonial empires by pointing out the levels of corruption and incompetence of the Chinese National Army and suggesting the value of opening an overland line of communication to China from northern Burma.

He suggested increasing the strength of three Army divisions, moving US troops in India to China after the occupation of northern Burma, and attacking Shanghai and Taiwan if necessary.

Of the three options, Churchill was particularly fond of Operation Musket[4] since he hoped to send troops to Achab Island and seize Sumatra in an attempt to recapture Singapore.

Three divisions of IV Corps, assembled at Imphal, would then move east with the objective of destroying Japanese lines of communication[4] and advancing to Arak and various parts of Sidon in northern Burma.

[5] Chiang believed that any offensive on land should be timed with naval operations, because the Japanese were very motivated to defend and reinforce their important position in Burma and would also benefit from the new infrastructure and supply lines that they had been building.

Although the British supported Operation Tarzan, they were not keen on a large-scale naval offensive in the Bay of Bengal, and Churchill told Chiang that the navy could not be dispatched to the Indian Ocean until after the defeat of Italy.

Admiral Ernest King of the US Navy was less enthusiastic about a counteroffensive on Burma and was reluctant to push hard for large-scale operations in the Southeast Asia Command.

[12] At a meeting of US Army officers, Marshall made clear his disapproval of Chiang's insistence for the US Air Force to airlift 10,000 tonnes of supplies to China each month despite British and American opposition.

[4] To show his appreciation to his wife the first lady, Soong Mei-ling, who assisted him so much in the conference, Chiang awarded her the Order of the Blue Sky and White Sun upon his return to China.

[12] He was unhappy with the fact that Roosevelt took so long to confer with Chiang, saying that "the talks between British and American personnel were disturbed and distressingly confused by Chinese matters.

"[15] The British Chief of Staff, Alan Brooke, felt that Chiang was shrewd and cunning, and was determined to take advantage of the bargain despite failing to grasp the situation.

In November that year, as agreed at the Cairo Conference, Field Marshal William Joseph Slim's XV Corps departed for Burma, while the two Chinese divisions at Langga were mobilised to Lido, Assam, to engage the Japanese in December.

Roosevelt and George Marshall argued over the number of men, while Churchill sought to abandon the operation and concentrate supplies on the Aegean in Greece, a plan that the American military leadership was less than enthusiastic about.

[4] On November 29, Churchill told the Chief of Staff to record the Prime Minister's "special rejection of Commissar General Chiang's request that we should conduct both amphibious and land operations in Burma".

He attempted to reverse this decision by informing Churchill that China would continue to build up its Yunnan forces but would not move into Burma unless the planned amphibious operation was launched as scheduled.

[4] On December 21, 1943, Churchill authorised Mountbatten to mobilise 20,000 men for an amphibious operation, but instead of taking the Andaman Islands, an attack on the Rakhine coast behind the Japanese lines was launched.

[5] Chiang refused to accept a small attack on the Rakhine coast as a substitute for Operation Buccaneer[4] and for some time was reluctant to send troops into Burma from Yunnan.

In August 1945, Soong Tse-vung visited the United States and mentioned the matter, but US president Harry Truman reneged on the promise of equipment for 60 divisions.

[13] China's demand at the Cairo Conference to recover lost territories was subsequently endorsed by Stalin,[13] to end the Japanese puppet Manchukuo after the war.

[8] In order to make Korea free and independent, Roosevelt planned to establish an international trusteeship as a transitional phase of arrangement, and his proposal was accepted by Stalin at the Tehran and Yalta Conferences.

Following the announcement of the Cairo Declaration, Emperor Hirohito convened the Imperial Council, at which moderate forces grew in power compared to the weakening militarists and nationalists.

[8] In July 1945, the Potsdam Proclamation of China, Britain, and the United States made an ultimatum to Japan, also using the Cairo Declaration as the basis for unconditional surrender.