Catenaccio

In Italian, catenaccio means "door-bolt", which implies a highly organised and effective backline defence focused on nullifying opponents' attacks and preventing goal-scoring opportunities.

The two full-backs then became in effect central defenders, playing initially almost alongside each other, although in practice, if the opposition attacked down their right, the left of the two would move towards the ball, with the right covering just behind, and vice versa.

[3][4][5][6][7] During his time with Soviet club Krylya Sovetov Kuybyshev in the 1940s, Alexander Kuzmich Abramov also used a similar defensive tactic known as the Volzhskaya Zashchepka, or the "Volga Clip."

Unlike the verrou, his system was not as flexible, and was a development of the 3–2–5 or WM, rather than the 2–3–5, but it also featured one of the half-backs dropping deep; this allowed the defensive centre-half to sweep in behind the full-backs, essentially acting as a sweeper.

[11] "Mezzo sistema" was influenced by Rappan's verrou and originated from an idea that one of the club's players altered the English WM system – known as the sistema in Italy – by having his centre-half-back – known as the centromediano metodista or "metodista," in Italy – retreat into the defensive line to act as an additional defender and mark an opposing centre-forward, instead leaving his full-back (which, at the time, was similar to the modern centre-back role) free to function as what was essentially a sweeper, or libero ("free," in Italian).

Indeed, although his Grande Inter side were known primarily for their defensive strength, they were equally renowned for their ability to score goals with few touches from fast, sudden counter-attacks, due to Herrera's innovative use of attacking, overlapping full-backs.

His team adopted a more attractive playing style in the lead-up to the 1974 World Cup, however, which saw them considered among the favourites to win, but suffered a surprising first-round elimination in the final tournament.

Unlike previous systems, in Total Football, no out–field player is fixed in their nominal role; anyone can assume in the field the duties of an attacker, a midfielder or a defender, depending on the play.

[13][47][48] Highly defensive structures with little attacking intent – which are colloquially often referred to as "anti-football" or "parking the bus," and which have been employed at times by managers such as José Mourinho and Diego Simeone – are often arbitrarily and incorrectly labelled as Catenaccio by pundits, managers, and players, but this deviates from the original design of the system; while catenaccio was similarly an organised system that involved tactical discipline and deep, heavy, and patient defending off – or even behind – the ball, it also made use of now obsolete man-to-man marking, a sweeper, who was tasked with protecting the back-line and also starting plays after winning back possession, as well as employing sudden counter–attacks to score goals.

[59][60][61][62] Rob Smyth of The Guardian was critical of Spain's striker–less formation and particular brand of tiki-taka at UEFA Euro 2012, however, believing that the lack of emphasis on the offensive aspect of the game led to fewer goals, and that the team's seemingly endless passing and preoccupation with ball–possession was in fact boring, dubbing it "Tiki-takanaccio," a reference to the defensive–minded catenaccio tactical system, despite the fact that tiki-taka had ironically originated from the more offensive minded Dutch total football strategy.

[64][65] Several of Italy's previous coaches, such as Cesare Maldini and Giovanni Trapattoni, used elements of catenaccio to a greater extent at international level,[66][67] and both failed to go far in the tournaments in which they took part; under Maldini, Italy lost on penalties to hosts France in the 1998 FIFA World Cup quarter-finals, following a 0–0 draw,[68] while Trapattoni lost early in the second round of the 2002 FIFA World Cup to co-hosts South Korea on a golden goal,[69] and subsequently suffered a first-round elimination at UEFA Euro 2004.

While Dino Zoff's 5–2–1–2 system initially largely differed from the more defensive-minded approach of his predecessors who were in charge of the Italy national side, by introducing younger players and adopting a more attractive and offensive-minded approach,[61][71][72] he also made use of a sweeper, a tight back-line, and put Catenaccio to good use for Italy in the semi-final of UEFA Euro 2000 against co-hosts Netherlands, when the team went down to ten men; despite coming under criticism in the media for his defensive playing style during the match, following a penalty shoot-out victory after a 0–0 draw, he secured a place in the final.

Despite their more aggressive attacking approach under Vicini during the latter tournament, Italy initially struggled in the first round, before recovering their form in the knock-out stages, and produced small wins in five hard-fought games against defensive sides, in which they scored little but risked even less, totalling only seven goals for and none against leading up to the semi-finals of the competition.

[79][80][81][82][83][84] Vicini's successor as the Italy national side's manager, Arrigo Sacchi, also attempted to introduce his more attacking–minded tactical philosophy, which had been highly successful with Milan, to the Italy national team; his tactics, which were inspired by Dutch total football, made use of an aggressive high-pressing system, which used a 4–4–2 formation, an attractive, fast, attacking, and possession-based playing style, and which also used innovative elements such as zonal marking and a high defensive line playing the offside trap, which largely deviated from previous systems in Italian football, despite still maintaining defensive solidity.

[85][86][87][88][89] Previously, at the 1978 FIFA World Cup, Enzo Bearzot's Italian side also often adopted an attractive, offensive-minded possession game based on passing, creativity, movement, attacking flair, and technique, due to the individual skill of his players; the front three would also often change positions with one another, in order to disorient the opposing defenders.

At the 1982 FIFA World Cup, he instead adopted a more flexible and balanced tactical approach, which was based on the zona mista system, and which used a fluid 4–3–3 formation, with Gaetano Scirea as a sweeper, who held both defensive and creative duties.

[76][90][91] Bearzot's Italy side were also known for their solidity, aggression, and defensive strength, possessing a number of hard–tackling players in their team, such as midfielder Marco Tardelli, and defenders Claudio Gentile and Giuseppe Bergomi.

[94][95] Notwithstanding their more attacking minded playing style throughout the tournament, when Italy was reduced to ten men in the 50th minute of the 2nd round match against Australia, following Marco Materazzi's red card, coach Lippi changed the Italians' formation to a defensive orientation which caused the British newspaper The Guardian to note that "the timidity of Italy's approach had made it seem that Helenio Herrera, the high priest of Catenaccio, had taken possession of the soul of Marcello Lippi."

[106][107][108] During Italy's victorious UEFA Euro 2020 campaign, Roberto Mancini – who once had a reputation for being a more defensive-minded and pragmatic manager – instead built on the work of Maurizio Viscidi at youth level, as well as Maurizio Sarri, Roberto De Zerbi and Gian Piero Gasperini in Serie A, using a 4–3–3 formation and an attractive, attacking style based on fluid passing in possession – built around the gameplay of the midfield trio of Marco Verratti, Jorginho and Nicolò Barella – and energetic pressing and counterpressing out of possession.

[113] German coach Otto Rehhagel used a similarly defensive approach for his Greece side in UEFA Euro 2004, with the team defending deeply behind the ball, and putting pressure on their opponents, while Traianos Dellas operated as a sweeper behind the back-line.

"[122] Critics and foreign footballers who have played in the Serie A have described Italian defenders as being "masters of the dark arts"[123][124][125] motivated by a Machiavellian philosophy of winning a game at all costs by cunning and calculating methods.