Until the establishment of the Central Control Commission (CCC) at the 5th National Congress in 1927, local party committees were responsible for supervising members.

[8] Although it focused on abuses by party veterans and senior officials, the CCDI rarely appeared on record at that time as investigating (or solving) those problems.

[13] At the 9th National Congress in 1969, the CCC was abolished, removed from the party constitution, and replaced by special-case organizations (such as the Central Case Examination Group) formed under Mao and Kang Sheng.

[26] After weakening under Zhao Ziyang, CCDI power increased in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 under the tutelage of Deng and Jiang Zemin.

[28] CCDI Secretary Wei Jianxing allegedly tendered his resignation "on the eve" of the 5th Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee in 2000 to protest the commission's impotence.

[29] In late 2013, Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and head of China's security agencies, was placed under investigation by the CCDI for abuse of power and corruption, a decision state media announced in July 2014.

[38] The CCDI system was not empowered to the same extent as its Soviet counterpart, since Mao favored mass mobilization and ideological campaigns over party disciplinary measures to curb bad behavior.

[14] The institutional balance favoring party committees led some (such as Gao Gang and Rao Shushi) to pack local commissions for discipline inspection (CDI) with loyalists who had no interest in carrying out their responsibilities.

[43] Bonds were forged with the Ministry of Supervision (MOS) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate to strengthen the anti-corruption agencies' control of "the rapidly expanding party organization and an increasingly elaborate state bureaucracy".

[43] The main goals of these reforms were to strengthen the autonomy of the control commissions from the local ruling committees[14] and safeguard the powers of the center, which were threatened during the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi affair.

[48] Although the organizers of the system were aware of the danger, they believed that the CDIs (through their connection with the central leadership) would be able to carry out their assigned task despite their election by the committee they were supposed to inspect.

[54] The 12th National Congress introduced "dual leadership" in local CDIs; they were responsible to the party committees at their (and the higher) level and to the higher-level CDI.

[27] Reformist general secretary Zhao Ziyang wanted to end CCDI meddling in China's legal system and reduce its scope to party-discipline issues.

[35] Commission power was increased, and the CCDI issued the "five forbiddens"; party members could not "(1) operate a business, (2) work in an economic entity, (3) trade in stocks, (4) accept gifts, or (5) use public funds for lavish entertainment.

The CCDI Secretary was now the chief coordinator of all anti-corruption efforts on the mainland, a position later known as Leader of the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work.

[59] These teams, led by retired ministerial-level officials and reporting to the CCDI rather than local party committees,[59] were empowered to initiate investigations, conduct interviews, and review relevant documents.

[62] At the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in the fall of 2013, the party declared that it would "strengthen the 'dual leadership' system [over the CCDI] by making it more defined, procedure-oriented, and institutionalised.

[60] Although they no longer needed approval from the secretary of the corresponding-level party committee, CDI officials were often appointed to positions of power within the institutions they were tasked to supervise (see above).

[76] Despite this, there are several weaknesses to its institutional design in the sense that certain informal aspects of CCP rule compete with formal procedures (that the CCDI and its lower-level organs are tasked with supervising) for hegemony.

Examples are, as outlined by Xuezhi Guo, "vague institutional positions, incrementally declining effects as time goes by, vulnerability to patron-clientelism or guanxi network at the grassroots level, and the dilemma of 'open' or 'undercover' investigation".

[77] The regulations which govern inspection team conduct states that they must: "Learn from the reports from local party committees; Participate in party disciplinary meetings; Manage whistleblower letters, phone calls, and visits; Regarding issues of party members or officials; Organize forums to understand public opinions of local leaders; Communicate with individuals; Review relevant documents and records; Conduct surveys and evaluate the opinions of the public; Visit the local bureau or individual department; and Consult with other government departments to gain better understand[ing] of the issues.

[78] Direct CCDI involvement has only been cited in high-profile cases, such as Vice Admiral Wang Shouye in 2005 and Lieutenant General Gu Junshan in 2012.

[79] In these dual investigations, the CDIs (and sometimes the CCDI) claimed primary jurisdiction over cases involving important party figures and tried to prevent the MOS from doing its work.

[89] According to Ting Gong, the main problem is that if an ordinary party member lodges a complaint or accuses an official of corruption, "there is no guarantee that personal petitions will be accommodated or even processed as they are subject to further investigation and the approval of higher-level authorities".

[94] Andrew Wederman wrote that by looking at the "offences based on annual reports by provincial DICs contained in provincial yearbooks", its responsibility includes 20 types of offences; "[a]rbitrary and dictatorial exercise of power, [a]narchism, [f]actionalism, [f]avouritism, [i]nsubordination, [h]eterodoxy (such as bourgeois spiritual pollution, leftism), [p]rivilege seeking, [n]epotism and use of Party authority to advance their families, friends and relatives, [b]ureaucratism, [a]dministrative inefficiency, [c]ommandism, [h]oarding, [p]etty corruption, [f]raud, [e]mbezzlement, [t]heft, [s]muggling, [b]ribery, [i]llegal acquisition of and dealing in foreign exchange, [and] [w]asting and squandering public funds".

[94] The party constitution vaguely defines the CCDI's jurisdiction:[96] Resolutely implement the Party's basic line, principles, and policies ... correctly exercise the powers entrusted to them by the people, be honest and upright, work hard for the people, make themselves an example, carry forward the style of hard work and plain living, forge closer ties with the masses, uphold the Party's mass line, accept criticism and supervision by the masses, oppose bureaucratism, and oppose the unhealthy trend of abusing one's power for personal gain.

[100] The subject is detained in an unspecified location under a 24-hour suicide watch by a team of six to nine "accompanying protectors" (as they are officially called), working eight-hour shifts.

"[106] Despite this, until the 16th National Congress, the CCP's anti-corruption system was based on campaign-style events rather than formal procedures (partially due to the 1940s Yan'an Rectification Movement and its legacy).

[107] To formalize its procedures, the 16th CCDI Standing Committee passed regulations requiring all local CDIs to combat corruption with lawful methods.

[107] Signaling their serious intent, the CCDI, the CCP's Organization Department, the MOS, and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission issued joint "Regulations on Honestly Conducting Business by Leaders of the State-Run Enterprises" in 2005.