Charcoal trafficking in Somalia
[1] In the 1990s, the Somali Civil War, destructive El Niño floods, and reduced access to the European market caused the former prosperous banana industry to collapse, leading to an increase in reliance on the charcoal trade.
Once in the Gulf states, middlemen sell the charcoal in smaller quantities to retailers and restaurants for use in shisha water pipes and grilling meat, respectively.
[7][8] Deforestation in turn leaves the country vulnerable to droughts, famines, and floodings and increases the risks for conflicts over resources and severe humanitarian crises.
Somali charcoal traders have expressed that the trade is the only sensible livelihood, as employment is difficult to find and lack of rivers and reliable sources of water renders farming tough.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) representatives have stressed the need to address poverty and invest in opportunity for business to create conditions for other, sustainable forms of livelihood.
[4] In 2014, the UNSC followed up with resolution 2182, in which Member States were authorised to inspect ships suspected of carrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the ban, and to seize and dispose of the illicit cargo by diverting the vessels to a port.
[28] According to reports of UN monitors, the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have undermined implementation of the charcoal ban.
[32] Moreover, KDF and AMISOM have on multiple occasions been reported to deny the federal government and the UN monitors access to stockpiles sites and key ports of export to conduct investigations.
[32] The charcoal trade in southern Somalia relies on partnerships between local business communities, mainly in Kismayo, and corrupt regional authorities.
[37][38] In 2016, UN monitors complained that the Federal Government of Somalia did not take enough action to address existing stockpiles of charcoal, which posed dangers to peace and security in the area.
[39] Although the stockpiles are yet to be cleared,[11] the federal government acknowledges the environmental and security threat posed by the trade[40] and has called for increased international cooperation enforce the charcoal ban.
[11][43] UN monitors have repeatedly criticised the GCC states for their inaction in enforcing the charcoal embargo imposed by resolution 2036, and for their lack of collaboration with international actors such as UN officials.
[49] CMF have held several conferences together with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries aimed at combatting the illegal smuggling of Somali charcoal.
The aim of this strengthened partnership is to promote better information sharing and training, thus improving efforts to combat the illegal smuggling of charcoal from Somalia.
[51] Several United Nations (UN) organisations, committees and functions conduct anti-trafficking measures to facilitate the implementation of the Somali charcoal embargo.
Following a written request from President Hassan Sheikh in October 2014, the UNSC authorized international naval fleets to intercept any vessel suspected of transporting charcoal in the Indian Ocean.
[61] Some of the individuals involved in the illicit trade are business leaders and politicians who had received support from the international community to rebuild the Somalia's state institutions.
[54] From 2017 onwards, UN monitors observed that illicit charcoal trade appeared to have been facilitated by more formalised transnational criminal networks operating between Somalia and the UAE.
Notably, the monitors acquired information regarding the All Star Group corporation, believed to be the primary supplier, trafficker, and investor in the charcoal trade.
[64][65] However, High Representative/Vice-President of the EEAS Josep Borrell has suggested that an exit for Operation Atalanta should be sought, expressing the need for Somalia to "take full ownership for its own security by the end of 2024".
[67] After Al-Shabaab’s capture of the port of Kismayo in 2009, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began importing Somali charcoal at an increasing rate.
[69] Despite the charcoal ban by UNSC resolution 2036 in 2012, both authorities of Somalia and importing Gulf countries failed to take sufficient measures to curb the trade.
[71] Following the capture of Barawe port by the Somali National Army and AMISOM in October 2014, Al-Shabaab lost control over major export sites for charcoal.
According to UN monitors, unconfirmed reports of a breakdown in a revenue-sharing agreement between Al-Shabaab and the president of the Jubaland State of Somalia, Ahmed Mohamed Islam, may explain this strategic shift.
The last significant shipment took in place August 2018, when 4,750 tons of charcoal, consisting of 190,000 sacks, left Kismayo for Khor Al Zubair port in Iraq.
[81] The Federal Government of Somalia increased political messaging about the negative environmental impact of charcoal production, contributing to the decline in trade.
[85] UN monitors recommended a one-time partial liftingof the charcoal embargo in 2022 to facilitate the clean-up of existing stockpiles around Kismayo, which are estimated to be worth US$12 million.
[90] Monitoring shipments is further complicated by the fact that smugglers stockpile and load charcoal in remote locations, such as for example Buur Gaabo, to avoid detection.
[32] Forged paperwork claim that Somali charcoal originates from countries such as Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania or Pakistan.
The charcoal was then reloaded onto smaller Iranian-flagged dhows and exported to the port of Hamriyah, UAE, using false certificates of origin claiming Iran to be the country of manufacture.
