Reeling from these defeats, the UN Command sought to commence ceasefire negotiations with the Chinese government in January 1951, but Mao Zedong and his colleagues ardently refused; as a result, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 498 on 1 February, condemning China as an aggressor, and demanded that its forces withdraw from Korea.

In the Pogae-san heights, the 25th Division attacked toward Ch'orwon, but made no substantial progress after receiving increasing artillery fire during the day and becoming involved in hard fights right at the Utah Line, especially in the zone of the Turkish Brigade along Route 33.

On the east flank of the advance, the Hwacheon Dam, defended so stoutly by PVA 39th Army forces only a few days earlier, fell to the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment (1st KMC) without a fight.

[1] Of these, he ordered 270,000 from the III, IX and XIX Army Groups to be directed for an assault towards Seoul, while the rest were deployed elsewhere on the battlefront with 214,000 men serving as their strategic reserve to be committed for support purposes.

From above the Imjin on the west wing of the main effort, the XIX Army Group was to attack southeast toward Seoul, crossing the river on a 12 miles (19 km) front centered on the Korangp’o-ri bend and advancing on the capital through a narrowing zone between Routes 1 and 33.

[2]: 379–81 In what would be essentially a separate effort east of the Hwacheon Reservoir, KPA forces were to strike for Yanggu and Inje, where breakthroughs could open up Routes 29 and 24 leading southwestward to Chuncheon and Hongcheon.

[2]: 382–3 Having lost radio and wire communications with his regimental commanders soon after the panic began, Chang was hard pressed to regain control of his forces, even when they outdistanced the PVA pursuit after midnight.

En route aboard trucks before midnight, the 1st Battalion struggled west against a current of retreating South Koreans and scarcely managed to establish a position before dawn.

[2]: 383–4 Eager to close ranks as the IX Corps' front quieted after daylight on the 23rd, Hoge ordered the ROK 6th Division to occupy positions on the Kansas Line, 3 miles (4.8 km) north of the area in which Chang was reassembling his forces.

Chang faced no small task in recovering troops who had scattered east and west into adjacent sectors, reorganizing his entire division, and then moving his nervous forces north toward the PVA.

Near dawn General Joseph S. Bradley ordered the 24th and 27th Infantry Regiments to withdraw 2 miles (3.2 km) and instructed the Turkish Brigade to leave the line and reorganize south of the Hantan River.

Taken under frontal attack and threatened with encirclement by the KPA working through the gap, the 5th Regiment followed suit but withdrew in better order, falling back gradually while still in contact toward a line 2 miles (3.2 km) above Inje.

Almond on the morning of the 25th ordered an afternoon attack by the ROK 5th Division to retake Inje and the high ground immediately above the town as a first step in regaining the Kansas Line.

Also crossing the Imjin during the night in the Korangp’o-ri bend area, the 189th Division of the 63rd Army advanced southeast on a course taking it into the gap between the ROK 12th Regiment and the Gloster battalion on Hill 235.

As suspected, KPA I Corps was joining the offensive, although its initial move ended abruptly when its 8th Division attempted to cross the Imjin over the railroad bridge near Munsan-ni and was blown back with high losses from artillery fire and air attacks.

Earlier, after the PVA had captured Hill 664 3 miles (4.8 km) directly north of the Route 3 crossing, Bradley had set the 3rd Battalion, 27th Infantry, in a blocking position above the bridge.

It was late afternoon before the tankers returned with the Rangers and Wilson got his forces in march order for withdrawing down Route 3A through the positions of the 19th Infantry and into an assembly area four miles behind the Delta Line.

Moving out under continuing fire, but not pursued by the PVA, Wilson's forces followed the roundabout route and escaped without further losses, reaching the lines of the 19th Infantry shortly after dark.

Milburn ordered the next withdrawal at midmorning on the 26th after attacks opened during the night by KPA I Corps and PVA XIX Army Group made inroads along the western portion of his Delta front.

Since the Marines' withdrawal otherwise would leave X Corps with an open left flank, Almond was obliged to order the US 2nd and 7th Divisions away from the Hwacheon Reservoir and the west shoulder of the KPA salient in the Inje area.

His determination to fight for the city lay behind his refusal to allow the Eighth Army simply to surrender ground in deep withdrawals and behind his order of 23 April directing a strong stand on the Kansas Line.

[2]: 433–4 Convinced by the morning of the 28th that the main enemy effort in the west was wearing out, Van Fleet informed Corps commanders that he intended to hold firmly on the No-Name Line.

A PVA battalion attacking the 7th Cavalry below Uijeongbu early in the morning, but soon breaking contact after failing to penetrate and patrols investigating the positions of the 25th Division around noon were the only other enemy actions along the I Corps' front during the day.

Accurate defensive fire, especially from tanks, artillery, and the guns of the USS Toledo, broke up the attack before enemy assault forces could get through the outpost line and reach the main ROK positions.

To deepen the search in the west and central areas, Van Fleet ordered patrol bases set up 5–6 miles (8.0–9.7 km) out along a line reaching east as far as Route 24 in the X Corps' sector.

Patrols operating from the bases could work farther north with full fire support, and the forward positions would deepen the defense in the sectors where Van Fleet expected to be most heavily attacked.

In further instructions for defense, Van Fleet ordered the No-Name Line fortifications improved and directed Hoge to give special attention to the Pukhan corridor, where the heaviest enemy buildup was reported.

Though the Topeka advance was off, Van Fleet ordered the Canadians to move north, beginning on 15 May, to Kumnyangjang-ni, 25 miles (40 km) southeast of Seoul, and prepare to counter any enemy penetration in the Pukhan or Seoul-Suwon corridors.

The 3rd Division was still to pass to army reserve and organize forces capable of reinforcing or counterattacking in the I, IX or X Corps sectors in at least regimental combat team strength on six hours’ notice.

On the basis of these dispositions, Van Fleet continued to believe that the main enemy effort would come in the west central sector, probably toward the Han River corridor, and would be made by five armies, the 60th, 15th, 12th, 27th and 20th.