In 1964, China adopted a policy of no-first-use (NFU),[10][2] although some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture in the early 2020s.

[11][12] Mao Zedong referred to nuclear weapons as a paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce.

[14]: 89–90  While Mao did not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, he believed that even a few bombs would increase China's diplomatic credibility.

As a result of the Anti-Party Group incident in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's position within the Eastern Bloc became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao.

The Agreement on New Technology for National Defence was later signed in October, which promised Soviet support for Chinese development of nuclear weapons.

[15] Construction of uranium-enrichment plants in Baotou and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960.

[17] That year, however, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain.

[4] According to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director William Foster, the American government, under Kennedy and Johnson administration, was concerned about the program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested.

[19] In 2023, satellite open-source intelligence showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where nuclear weapons testing could resume.

[21] In 2024, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that China has approximately 300 missile silos and is estimated to reach at least 1000 operational warheads by 2030.

[27] American defense analysts have contended that China is shifting away from a strict no-first-use strategy and toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture, which would allow it to retaliate upon the detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first.

[31] Though China continued developing more advanced nuclear technology and weapons, by the 1980s, the country had indicated that it intended on accepting the terms of the NPT.

[30]: 71  The six-party talks ultimately failed,[30]: 75  and in 2006, China voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear program.

[37] China refused to join talks in 2020 between the U.S. and Russia on extending their bilateral New START nuclear arms reduction treaty, as the Trump administration requested.

There have been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic missile technology.

In 2000, General Eugene Habiger of the U.S. Air Force, then-commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified before Congress that China has 18 silo-based DF-5s.

[citation needed] China has also developed the DF-31A, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,200+ km with possibly 3–6 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability.

[citation needed] The Dong Feng 31 (or CSS-10) is a medium-range, three stage, solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People's Republic of China.

[citation needed] The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) stockpile of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is thought to be relatively new.

The Chinese navy has developed Type 094 ballistic missile submarine; open source satellite imagery has shown that at least two of these have been completed.

[49]: 93–98  The Chinese have also produced the Xian JH-7 Flying Leopard fighter-bomber with a range and payload exceeding the F-111 (currently about 80 are in service) capable of delivering a nuclear strike.

[49]: 102 China is alleged to be testing new H-8 and Xian H-20 strategic bombers which are either described as an upgraded H-6 or an aircraft in the same class as the US B-2, able to carry nuclear weapons.

[57] Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet germ-warfare programs, said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s.

Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites identified a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads.

The Soviets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases.

[58] US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations in a letter to Senator Bob Bennett (R-Utah) in January 1997.

The United States acted upon the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons.

It pointed to 42 facilities, some in the same compound, that had the capacity, possibly latently, of research, development, production or testing of biological weapons.